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Notice of assignment and discharge by
performance
Chee Ho Tham*
‘‘A debtor (A) who makes payment to the creditor (B) after having been
given notice of its assignment to an assignee (C) is at risk of having to make
payment again.’’ This appears to be a ‘‘well settled’’ aspect of the ‘‘transfer’’ of
the legal rights to a debt effected by either equitable or statutory assignment. Yet
it contradicts the common law rules as to invariability of a contractual obligation
and the automatic discharge of an obligation when it is precisely performed. It
is suggested that neither the doctrine underlying equitable assignment nor the
legislative framework for statutory assignment provides any basis for abrogating
these two common law rules. It may therefore be time to upset this ‘‘well
settled’’ rule.
I. INTRODUCTION
Notice plays an important role in the equitable assignment of legal choses in action, such
as a contractual debt.1 As noted in a recent treatise,2 once the debtor is given notice of the
equitable assignment:
(i) should she pay the sum owed to her creditor, she is not discharged from her
obligation but will have to make payment again to the assignee [the ‘‘no discharge
after notice’’ rule];
(ii) the assignee’s right against the debtor has priority against subsequent assignments
by the assignor, in order of precedence of notice [the rule as to priorities]; and
* Associate Professor, School of Law, Singapore Management University. Thanks are owed to Professor
Charles Rickett and Professor Adrian Briggs for their suggestions and encouragement. I would also like to thank
the anonymous referee for some very helpful comments. The Singapore Management University Office of
Research provided a research grant for this paper. The usual caveats apply.
The following abbreviations are used:
Chitty: Chitty on Contracts, 29th edn (London, 2002).
Halsbury: Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th edn (Reissue).
Judicature Act 1873: Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873.
Marshall: OR Marshall, The Assignment of Choses in Action (London, 1950).
Meagher, Gummow & Lehane: RP Meagher, JD Heydon and MJ Leeming, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s
Equity Doctrines and Remedies, 4th edn (Australia, 2002).
Smith: M Smith, The Law of Assignment (Oxford, 2007).
Treitel: E Peel, Treitel on the Law of Contract, 12th edn (Oxford, 2007).
Tolhurst: G Tolhurst, The Assignment of Contractual Rights (Oxford, 2006).
1. The discussion in this paper generally leaves aside discussion of assignments of leases, in particular,
assignments of the reversion. Differences in analysis arise primarily because there is privity of estate, as well as
privity of contract, as between the original lessor and his lessee. Some of these differences are discussed at n 90,
infra.
2. Smith, [7.68].
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(iii) the debtor is no longer entitled to assert such equities as may arise between herself
and the creditor post-notice to reduce her liability to the assignee by way of set-off
[the rule as to equities].
Leaving aside discussion of the second and third of these rules for another day, this
paper will focus on an examination of the ‘‘no discharge after notice’’ rule. This is
prompted because the rule as applied in the context of equitable assignment of a debt
presents a contradiction: it does not explain how it is that the common law rules as to
discharge by precise performance and the invariability of contractual obligations are
displaced by what appear to be equitable doctrines relating to assignment and notice
thereof. By examining the mechanics and subject matter of an equitable assignment of a
chose in action, this paper will demonstrate that the rule may, perhaps, have been too
broadly stated and that the true position is quite otherwise: that a debtor is discharged from
her obligation to make payment so long as she precisely performs her obligations as set
out in the contract, even if the rights under that contract have been assigned to a third party
to that contract, the equitable assignee, and even if she has been notified of such
assignment. The paper will then examine whether the same may be true in the case of a
statutory assignment.
II. ‘‘NO DISCHARGE AFTER NOTICE’’
Say A owes B £1,000; but B owes £1,000 to C. It would not be unusual for B to wish for
C to be ‘‘paid’’, not directly by himself, but by A. One way to achieve this involves B’s
assigning the debt owed to him by A over to C, the assignment being in consideration of
C’s releasing B’s indebtedness to him upon receipt of the £1,000 from A.3
The assignment of the legal4 chose in action may be statutory if all the requirements in
the Law of Property Act 1925, s 136(1) are complied with. If not, it may be equitable
should the intention to make such an assignment be sufficiently made manifest. Should C
not be paid, as a statutory assignee, C is entitled to bring legal proceedings against A on
the debt5 directly in his own name. Should C be an equitable assignee, similar proceedings
3. Others would include: appointing C as B’s agent or attorney for the purposes of accepting payment from
A, coupled with a mandate that C need not account to B for such receipts; promising to permit C to use B’s name
(on an indemnity for costs) to bring legal proceedings against A on the debt, if unpaid; entering into a tripartite
agreement wherein in consideration for A’s obligation to make payment to B being discharged, A promises to
make payment to C (ie, a novation); or where, following a request by B that A make payment of the debt owing
to B to C, A ‘‘acknowledges’’ to C that A will pay to C the sum otherwise payable to B on account of the loan
agreement between them, eg, Shamia v. Joory [1958] 1 QB 448.
4. The chose in action arising from the debt owed by A to B is legal and not equitable, since such chose in
action would have been recovered or enforced by an action at law, prior to the enactment of the Judicature Act
1873. References to choses in action hereafter should be taken to refer to legal and not equitable choses, unless
indicated otherwise.
5. For ease of exposition, this paper will concentrate on the question as to whether a debtor is entitled to claim
to be discharged by precise performance of her contractual obligation to pay her creditor. The same arguments
may be applied in relation to other contractual obligations, as the doctrine of precise performance does not
discriminate between obligations to pay money and obligations to perform other acts. So the arguments set out
below may apply, mutatis mutandis, to assignments of legal choses in action arising out of contract other than
debt.
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may be initiated, but only by joining B as either co-claimant6 (if B wishes to cooperate
with C) or as co-defendant (if not).7
Within the context of equitable assignment,8 it is often asserted that a debtor (A) who
is given notice of an equitable assignment of the debt makes payment to the creditor-
assignor (B) at her peril.9 Which is to say, she is at risk of having to make payment again
to the equitable assignee (C). This has been said to be a ‘‘well settled’’ aspect of the role
of notice in equitable assignment;10 and, in the context of an equitable assignment of a part
of a debt,11 Simon Brown LJ noted in Deposit Protection Board v. Dalia12 that:
‘‘4. Once notice of an equitable assignment is given to the debtor, he cannot thereafter deal
inconsistently with the assigned interest, for instance by making payment to the assignor: Jones v.
Farrell;13 Brice v. Bannister.14
5. In the case of an equitable assignment consisting of the assignment of part of a debt . . .  the
assignee cannot give a good discharge in respect of the assigned part of the debt nor can he sue the
debtor to judgment without first joining the assignor as a party to the proceeding—as co-plaintiff if
he co-operates, co-defendant if he does not . . . 
6. Conversely in such cases, the assignor likewise cannot give a good discharge even in respect
of the non-assigned part of the debt and he, too, must join the assignee in any proceedings brought
against the debtor. . . . ’’.15
Smith cites the first of these three paragraphs, as well as Brice v. Bannister, and Yates
v. Terry16 to support the proposition that, ‘‘[o]nce the debtor has notice of the assignment,
he must account to the assignee and not to the assignor’’,17 and that, ‘‘[i]f the debtor
disregards the notice [and pays the assignor], then he must pay again [to the assignee]’’.18
6. Formerly the plaintiff—but the terminology has been amended: Civil Procedure Rules 1998, CPR
2.3(1).
7. Walter & Sullivan Ltd v. J Murphy & Sons Ltd [1955] 2 QB 584 (CA), 588; Three Rivers District Council
v. Bank of England [1996] QB 292 (CA), 311.
8. The same dilemma is seemingly faced by debtors who are given notice of a statutory assignment; but the
discussion in Part VIII queries whether this is truly the case.
9. Eg, Walter & Sullivan Ltd v. J Murphy & Sons Ltd [1955] 2 QB 584 (CA), 588, per Parker LJ.
10. Ong Chin-Aun, ‘‘Notice in Equitable Assignment of Choses in Action: Divergence in the Common Law
and its Impact’’ (2002) 18 JCL 107, 107. Ong cites William Brandt’s Sons & Co v. Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd [1905]
AC 454 and Walter & Sullivan Ltd v. J Murphy & Sons Ltd [1955] 2 QB 584; [1955] 1 All ER 843 (CA) as
authority for this proposition. The authoritativeness of these cases on the point is examined in Part VII.
11. Following In re Steel Wing Co Ltd [1921] 1 Ch 349.
12. [1994] 2 AC 367 (CA), 381.
13. (1857) 1 De G & J 208; 44 ER 703. This case is further examined in Part VII.
14. (1878) 3 QBD 569. This case is further examined in Part VII.
15. Simon Brown LJ’s comments here echo the views of James LJ in Roxburghe v. Cox (1881) 17 Ch D 520,
526: ‘‘Now an assignee of a chose in action according to my view of the law, takes subject to all rights of set-off
and other defences which were available against the assignor, subject only to this exception, that after notice of
an assignment of a chose in action the debtor cannot by payment or otherwise do anything to take away or
diminish the rights of the assignee as they stood at the time of the notice. That is the sole exception. Therefore
the question is, Was this right of set-off existing at the time when the notice was given by the Duke of
Roxburghe?’’ No authority was cited by James LJ for the proposition, though, that precise performance of the
obligation of payment has the effect of diminishing the rights of the assignee as they stood at the time of the
notice.
16. [1902] 1 KB 527 (CA).
17. Smith, [13.21].
18. Ibid, [13.22].
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In this, in common with many other Commonwealth authors on the law of assignment,19
Smith shares the views set out in Treitel on the Law of Contract20 that:
‘‘it has been held that if the debtor [to whom notice of an equitable assignment has been given]
ignores the notice and pays the assignor he is not discharged and will have to make a second
payment to the assignee’’.
In the present edition of Treitel, Brice v. Bannister is cited as authority for the point,
although Jones v. Farrell,21 Durham Bros v. Robertson22 and Ex p Nichols23 are also cited
in support.
The consensus, therefore, is that payments by a debtor to her creditor will discharge the
payment obligation if made prior to receiving notice of an assignment of that debt, but not
if made post-receipt. Implicitly, it has been accepted that notice of the assignment has
substantive effects on the manner in which the debtor is to discharge her debt obligation.
But how does an equitable doctrine operate to modify what it is that the debtor must do
in order to count herself to be quit of her contractual obligations? For that is what the ‘‘no
discharge after notice’’ rule does.
That difficulty has been hitherto overlooked because two different, though interrelated,
questions may have been conflated. These are: (i) to whom the debtor is liable; and (ii) for
what the debtor is liable. Equitable assignment has quite a lot to say in answer to the first
question.24 It is not obvious that equitable assignment necessarily has anything to do with
the second. To answer that question, we look to the terms of the contract binding the
debtor and her creditor.
III. INVARIABILITY OF TERMS AND AUTOMATIC DISCHARGE BY
PRECISE PERFORMANCE
Generally, unless the contract expressly (or impliedly) provides that one of the contracting
parties is to have a unilateral power of variation, ‘‘[a] mere unilateral notification by one
party to the other, in the absence of any agreement, cannot constitute a variation of a
contract’’.25 Accordingly, as a matter of common law, the ‘‘double liability’’ which
19. Eg, Tolhurst, [4.20] and [8.06]; and Marshall, 106–107. Similar views may be found in more specialist
works. N Ruddy, S Mills, N Davidson, Salinger on Factoring, 4th edn (London, 2006), [8.09] cites William
Brandt’s Sons & Co v. Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd as authority for the proposition that ‘‘in addition to assisting the
factor in his claims to priority against competing interests in the debts, receipt of notice by the debtor also
prevents the discharge of the debtor by subsequent payment to the client [ie, the creditor-assignor] . . . ’’.
Likewise, H Beale, M Bridge, L Gullifer, and E Lomnicka, The Law of Personal Property Security (Oxford,
2007), [5.93] rely on Brice v. Bannister as authority for the proposition that, ‘‘After notice, the debtor does not
obtain a good discharge by paying the assignor.’’
20. Treitel, 725–726, n 95. The very first edition of this work stated: ‘‘If [the debtor] disregards the notice [of
assignment] and pays the assignor, he is not discharged and will have to make a second payment to the
assignee’’: GH Treitel, The Law of Contract (London, 1962), 440, citing as authority Jones v. Farrell (1857) 1
D. & J 208 and Brice v. Bannister (1878) 3 QBD 569.
21. (1857) 1 De G & J 208; 44 ER 703.
22. [1898] 1 QB 765, 774. This case is further discussed in Part VII.
23. (1883) 22 Ch D 782, 787. This case is re-examined in Part VII.
24. See Part V(B)(ii).
25. Chitty, [22.032], citing Cowey v. Liberian Operations Ltd [1966] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 45.
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necessarily arises once the ‘‘no discharge after notice’’ rule is applied ought not to be
possible.
Such an outcome is inconsistent with the common law principle of invariability of
contractual obligations once they have been set out in the form of contract terms;26 and
with the common law principle that contractual obligations are discharged automatically
once they have been fully performed in compliance with the terms of the contract.27
Keeping these two principles in mind, it seems indisputable that a contractual obligation
will be discharged once it is precisely performed;28 and such obligations are invariable
without further valuable consideration being furnished to the debtor/obligor, who must,
needless to say, assent to such variation.29
Suppose, for good consideration provided by Q, P promises Q to pay £100 to Z. Q then
equitably assigns his legal rights in the debt, the chose in action, to R. Can R now demand
that P pay to himself instead of to Z? Even in equity, R may not assert any such right,
unless P’s contractual promise was to pay to Q’s assigns/nominees.30 R, as assignee, takes
no better right than Q, the assignor,31 and it is difficult to see how Q would have been able
to persuade any court of Equity that P ought to be ordered pay anyone other than Z:32
surely no equitable order could issue to prevent a debtor from paying the contractually-
26. This follows logically from the need for an enforceable agreement of variation between the original
contracting parties for the contract to be varied: n 25, supra.
27. Perhaps because a contract discharged by performance seldom attracts litigation, authority for this
seemingly obvious proposition has been rather difficult to locate. Treitel, [17.001] assures us, however, that ‘‘[a]
party who performs a contract in accordance with its terms is thereby discharged from his obligations under it’’.
To similar effect: ‘‘Full performance consistent with the terms of the agreement discharges a legal duty’’: JM
Perillo (Gen ed), Corbin on Contracts—Discharge, vol 13 (rev edn) (Newark, 2003), § 67.3. In Chambers v.
Miller (1862) 32 LJ CP 30, 33, Williams J noted: ‘‘where money is paid, not in satisfaction of a prior breach of
contract, but in performance of a duty at the proper time, no acceptance by the taker is necessary at all. The party
making the payment has performed his duty as soon as he has handed the money to the person to whom it is due,
and the transaction is complete’’.
28. ‘‘The general rule is that a party to a contract must perform exactly what he undertook to do’’: Chitty,
[21.001].
29. As we are concerned only with the ‘‘variation’’ of the debtor’s executory obligation of payment, the
broader concepts of estoppel and waiver (which apply to both executed and executory obligations) need not
detain us: see S Wilken, Wilken and Villiers on The Law of Waiver, Variation and Estoppel, 2nd edn (Oxford,
2002) where at [2.04], it is observed that, ‘‘The Courts have historically analysed variation of contract as
analogous to the entry by the parties into a new contract. The requirements of offer, acceptance and consideration
were therefore imposed’’. If contract obligations once formed were variable without such requirements, the
elaborate analysis in cases such as Goss v. Lord Nugent (1883) 5 B & Ad 58, 64–65; 110 ER 713, 716 as to what
is required for an effective variation would have been wholly unnecessary. For another view, suggesting that
consideration is merely a sufficient but not a necessary reason to enforce a promise to vary contractual
obligations and that estoppel ought to play a greater role in these matters, see C Ulyatt, ‘‘Should consideration
be required for the variation of contracts?’’ (2002) 9 Auckland ULRev 883 and D Halyk, ‘‘Consideration,
Practical Benefits and Promissory Estoppel: Enforcement of Contract Modification Promises in Light of Williams
v. Roffey Brothers’’ (1991) 55 Sask L Rev 393.
30. Whether expressly or impliedly.
31. See Parts V(A) and (B), infra.
32. There is some authority suggesting that an assignor who receives money from the debtor as payment for
the debt will hold such money on constructive trust for the benefit of the assignee: see discussion in Part X, infra.
If so, it follows that the creditor-assignor ought to be enjoined from receiving the debt for his own benefit. And
Windeyer J appears in his judgment in Norman v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1963) 109 CLR 9, 27 to
have taken L’Estrange v. L’Estrange (1850) 13 Beav 281 to have been a case where the creditor-assignor was
so restrained. But it is another matter altogether to enjoin the debtor from making payment to her creditor.
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named creditor if she so wishes, because to insist that she do otherwise is to compel her
to act in breach of contract?33
Where an equitable chose in action has been equitably assigned, notice to the obligor
may well have the effect of varying the nature and manner in which an obligor subject to
equitable obligations is to perform those duties.34 In such cases, there is no concern with
the common law rule as to invariability. Since equitable obligations fall within the
exclusive Equity jurisdiction, in exercise of that jurisdiction, the courts may formulate all
manner of rules as may govern such obligations but which depart from what would have
been the case had the obligations arisen at common law. The same cannot be true of
contractual choses in action like the contractual debts which are the subject matter of this
paper. So as to the equitable assignment of a contractual debt, it would appear the ‘‘no
discharge after notice’’ rule embodies a case where the rules as to Equity (in relation to
equitable assignment and the effect of notice) conflict with the rules of the common law.
This raises two questions: (i) if there is a conflict, which is to prevail? And, (ii) is there
a conflict at all?
IV. ‘‘EQUITY FOLLOWS THE LAW’’—OR PERHAPS NOT
Based on the above, there appears to be a conflict between the rules as to equitable
assignment and notice thereof, and the rules at common law as to invariability of
obligations and the automatic discharge of contractual obligations by precise performance.
Yet despite the maxim that ‘‘Equity follows the law’’, it seems to have been assumed35 that
both these common law rules are overridden when a debtor makes payment to her creditor
despite having been given notice that the debt had been assigned to another. Might
equitable assignment and notice thereof be an instance where the converse proposition
33. It is no answer to say that notice of equitable assignment of a debt only has such effect as is commonly
claimed for it in circumstances where the debtor would have been indifferent as to whom she should make
payment to, for, if so, why should the principle stop there? How is one to draw any principled distinction between
a contract where the debtor, A, is indifferent as to whether she should pay B, and another contract where the
obligor, J, is indifferent as to whether he should paint the house of the obligee, K, white, as expressly specified
in the contract, or pale green, as K now requests, having discussed the matter over with his wife after the contract
had been formed? In the latter situation, the issue is typically characterised as a contract variation whereby the
obligor J ‘‘purchases’’ a release from his obligation to paint K’s house white by agreeing to paint it pale green
instead. J’s ‘‘indifference’’ in the latter case plays no significant legal role at all; it only goes towards the
likelihood that the obligor might consent to the variation proposed by the obligee. That being so, the same should
apply in relation to a proposed change in the identity of the payee, there being no principled difference between
an obligation to pay money and an obligation to do something else.
34. Eg, Donaldson v. Donaldson (1854) Kay 709; 69 ER 303. In relation to the equitable assignment of a
beneficiary’s interest in a fund held by a trustee, Lord McNaghten cautioned: ‘‘[I]t has been said that notice
‘converts’ the trustee of the fund into a trustee for the person who gives the notice. But that, again, is hardly
accurate. The trustee of the fund is trustee for the persons entitled to the fund, whether he knows their names
or not. The notice, no doubt, places him under a direct responsibility to the person who gives the notice. If he
disregards the notice, he does so at his peril. But before notice is given he is just as much a trustee for the persons
rightfully entitled as he is after he receives the notice, though of course, in the absence of notice, he would be
safe in paying away the fund to those who appear by the instrument constituting the trust, or by title properly
deduced from them, to be the true owners’’, Ward v. Duncombe [1893] AC 369, 392.
35. Based on the authorities cited in Part II, supra.
43NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT AND DISCHARGE BY PERFORMANCE
©I
nf
or
m
a 
nu
ll -
 1
7/
12
/2
01
8 
08
:4
3
applies, that ‘‘where the rules of equity and common law conflict, the rules of equity are
to prevail’’?36
That proposition now finds statutory form in the Supreme Court Act 1981, s 49,37 which
‘‘embodies, in a concentrated form, the fundamental objectives of the Judicature Acts
1873–1875’’.38 Section 49(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 is a re-enactment of s 44 of
the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925,39 which, in turn, re-enacted
s 25(11) of the Judicature Act 1873, the effect of which was to eliminate conflicts between
common law and equitable rules ‘‘wheresoever arising’’ by, in effect, destroying the legal
rule and replacing it for all purposes by the equitable rule. ‘‘This now prevailed not by
virtue of a common injunction40 or the procedural innovations in Supreme Court litigation
wrought by s 24,41 but by force of s 25(11)’’.42
Of that provision, Maitland observed in his Lectures on Equity as follows:43
‘‘Now it may well seem to you that those are very important words, for perhaps you may have
fancied that at all manner of points there was a conflict between the rules of equity and the rules of
the common law, or at all events a variance. But the clause that I have just read [s 25(11), Judicature
Act 1873] has been in force now for over thirty years, and if you will look at any good commentary
upon it you will find that it has done very little—it has been practically without effect. . . .  [I]t is
important that even at the very outset of our career we should form some notion of the relation which
existed between law and equity in the year 1875. And the first thing that we have to observe is that
this relation was not one of conflict. Equity had come not to destroy the law, but to fulfil it. Every
jot and every tittle of the law was to be obeyed, but when all this had been done something might
yet be needful, something that equity would require. Of course now and again there had been
conflicts: there was an open conflict, for example, when Coke was for indicting a man who sued for
36. The rule is derived from the jurisdictional priority given to Equity arising from the decree issued by James
I in the month of July, 1616, that, ‘‘ . . .  [We] do will and command that our Chancellor, or Keeper of the Great
Seal for the Time being, shall not hereafter desist to give unto our subjects upon their several Complaints now
or hereafter to be made, such Relief in Equity (notwithstanding any Proceedings at the Common Law against
them) as shall stand with the Merit and Justice of their Cause, and with the former, ancient and continued
Practice and Presidency of our Chancery have done . . . ’’: 1 Chan Rep 49–50; 21 ER 588.
37. ‘‘Every Court exercising jurisdiction in England and Wales in any civil cause or matter shall continue to
administer law and equity on the basis that, wherever there is any conflict or variance between the rules of equity
and the rules of common law with reference to the same matter, the rules of equity shall prevail’’: Supreme Court
Act 1981, s 49.
38. The White Book Service 2009, vol 2 (London, 2009), [9A.170].
39. The 1925 Act was repealed and replaced by the Supreme Court Act 1981 with effect from 1 January
1982.
40. Being the form of injunction that led to the battle of wills between Coke and Lord Ellesmere which was
resolved only with the intervention of James I: see n 36, supra. One collection of precedents pre-dating the
Judicature Act 1873 suggests the following form for such an injunction: ‘‘Let an injunction be awarded to
restrain the Deft T, his attornies and agents, from further prosecuting the action commenced (by the Deft) against
the Plt (in H M Court of &c) as in the bill mentioned, to recover the amount of principal, interest, and costs
secured by the indenture dated &c, in the Plt’s bill mentioned; and from commencing (or prosecuting) any other
action at law (or taking any other proceeding) against the Plt for the recovery of such principal, interest, and
costs, or any part thereof, until the hearing of this cause, or until the further order of this Court’’: Sir Henry
Wilmot Seton, Forms of Decrees in Equity, 3rd edn (London, 1862), vol II, 874–875.
41. The common injunction was abolished by the Judicature Act 1873, s 24(5). This was re-enacted as s 41
of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925, s 41, before being replaced (albeit somewhat
confusingly) by the Supreme Court Act 1981, s 49(3).
42. Meagher, Gummow and Lehane, [2.115].
43. FW Maitland, Equity—A course of lectures (ed AH Chaytor and WJ Whittaker) (revised by J Brunyate)
(Cambridge, 1936), 16–17.
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an injunction. But such conflicts as this belong to old days, and for two centuries before the year
1875 the two systems had been working together harmoniously.’’
Maitland chose to illustrate the partnership between equity and common law by
referring to the trust:44
‘‘An examiner will sometimes be told that whereas the common law said that the trustee was owner
of the land, equity said that the cestui que trust was the owner. Well here in all conscience there
seems to be conflict enough. Think what this would mean were it really true. There are two courts
of co-ordinate jurisdiction—one says that A is the owner, the other says that B is the owner of
Blackacre. That means civil war and utter anarchy. Of course the statement is an extremely crude
one, it is a misleading and a dangerous statement . . .  Equity did not say that the cestui que trust was
the owner of the land, it said that the trustee was the owner of the land, but added that he was bound
to hold the land for the benefit of the cestui que trust. There was no conflict here. Had there been
a conflict here, [s 25(11), Judicature Act 1873] would have abolished the whole law of trusts.
Common law says that A is the owner, equity says that B is the owner, but equity is to prevail,
therefore B is the owner and A has no right or duty of any sort or kind in or about the land. Of course
the Judicature Act has not acted in this way: it has left the law of trusts just where it stood, because
it found no conflict, no variance, even, between the rules of the common law and the rules of
equity.’’
Accepting Maitland’s observations as to the Judicature Act 1873, s 25(11), the same
ought to be said of its modern-day successor, the Supreme Court Act 1981, s 49. That Act
came into force on 1 January 1982. Since the law of trusts did not come to an end on that
day on account of s 49, like its predecessors, that section must be taken to have had no
effect on the pre-existing law as to trusts, there being no relevant conflict.45 If that is right,
the same must be true of equitable assignment of debts, for, as the next Part will
demonstrate, it is more than arguable that such assignments operate by way of trust or
something very much like it.
V. THE NUTS AND BOLTS OF EQUITABLE ASSIGNMENT OF A
DEBT
A. The meaning of ‘‘transfer’’
The verb ‘‘to transfer’’ has a broad range of meanings. Within the context of transfers of
property, ie, a conveyance, the subject matter of the ‘‘transfer’’ is, on closer examination,
the legal and/or equitable right to the subject property. As noted in Tolhurst:46
‘‘In the context of a conveyance, the law’s focus is not merely on the transfer of tangible things but
on the transfer of property rights. However, a transferee never obtains the exact same property rights
as those held by the transferor. All property rights at a certain level of sophistication are personal
and incapable of this type of transfer. Rather, it is generally accepted that a transfer of rights occurs
44. Ibid, 17–18.
45. In relation to the trust, the ‘‘conflict’’ lay not in the rules, but in the effect of those rules in Equity and
at common law upon the litigants; and that conflict as to remedies (if any) is now resolved by reference to the
Supreme Court Act 1981, s 49(2) and (3). See also Meagher, Gummow & Lehane, [2.115–2.125].
46. Tolhurst, [3.10] (references omitted).
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when the transferor disposes of a right (which is extinguished) and where an equivalent and
derivative right is created and vested in the transferee’’.
Although this usage of the word ‘‘transfer’’ is debateable,47 the key aspect of a
‘‘transfer’’ is that the transferee is to obtain an equivalent right to that which, formerly, had
been available to the transferor.48
B. Is a debt ‘‘property’’ capable of ‘‘transfer’’ by equitable assignment?
Following Windeyer J’s analysis that an assignment involves ‘‘the immediate transfer of
an existing proprietary right, vested or contingent, from the assignor to the assignee’’,49
Dr Tolhurst accepts50 that:
‘‘assignment involves a transfer. One consequence of this is that the assignor cannot vest in the
assignee any greater right than he or she has: nemo dat quod non habet. This is the hallmark of
transfer. If the right did change its nature or content upon transfer it could hardly be described as
being property’’.
However, for the ‘‘no change’’ and ‘‘nemo dat’’ point to hold, it seems we must disregard
the change in the identity of the payee effected by notice to the debtor that the chose in
action in the debt has been equitably assigned mandated by the ‘‘no discharge after notice’’
rule. Yet it is no small matter to disregard such a change.
47. The appropriateness of describing such a transaction as entailing a ‘‘transfer’’ of rights is not universally
accepted: JE Penner, The Idea of Property in Law (Oxford, 1997), at p 147; JB Ames, ‘‘Disseisin of Chattels’’,
Ch 67 of Select Essays of Anglo-American Legal History vol 3 (Boston, 1909), at pp 582–583.
48. Given that an equitable assignment involves the creation of a new equitable interest simpliciter, as
opposed to the creation of a new interest that is equivalent to another that is simultaneously extinguished,
equitable assignment does not involve any ‘‘disposition’’ of interests from one party to another (adopting the
extended meaning of ‘‘transfer’’ used in Tolhurst: see text to n 46, supra). Thus, equitable assignment is ‘‘non-
dispositive’’. This paper does not take issue with the appropriateness of using ‘‘transfer’’ to describe a non-
dispositive doctrine, accepting that ‘‘transfer’’ may operate differently depending on the nature of the subject
matter in question.
49. Norman v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1963) 109 CLR 9, 26.
50. GJ Tolhurst, ‘‘Cheques, Property and the Notion of Transfer: Parsons v. R’’ (1999) 14 JCL 276, 280.
These points are made in the context of an attempt to explain how it is that the verb ‘‘transfer’’ may be
appropriately applied even to a situation where there cannot be any disposition of rights, but where there is only
the creation and extinction of rights. Specifically, Dr Tolhurst was concerned with the distinction drawn by Lord
Jauncey in R v. Preddy [1996] AC 815 between that situation and a case where rights are simply transferred in
the dispositive sense. Dr Tolhurst suggests that in both instances ‘‘transfer’’ is an appropriate verb to describe
what is happening because, even in a case of sale of goods, ‘‘we find that the same dealing in rights occurs, that
is, the seller’s rights are disposed of (and extinguished) and new and equivalent rights are vested in the buyer’’.
The same point is also made in Tolhurst, eg, [3.10–3.11]. It may be pointed out that, unlike a case of equitable
assignment of an equitable chose in action as occurs where a trust beneficiary directs his trustee henceforth to
hold the trust property for third parties nominated by the beneficiary which, as Lord Radcliffe points out, may
be treated as a ‘‘release or surrender’’ of the beneficiary’s equitable interest to the trustee (see Grey v. Inland
Revenue Commissioners [1960] AC 1, 16), where a creditor equitably assigns his rights in the legal chose in
action to the assignee, there is no ‘‘release’’ or ‘‘surrender’’ of any interest to the assignee at all. There is merely
the creation of a brand new equitable interest which did not previously exist. See also discussion in Part V(B)(i),
infra. Even if it is right to describe what happens in an equitable assignment of a legal chose in action as
amounting to a ‘‘transfer’’ of that chose in action, such ‘‘transfer’’, such non-dispositive transfer, even coupled
with notice, does not explain the apparent change in the nature of that obligation vis-a`-vis the identity of the party
to whom the debt is to be paid. Dr Tolhurst appears to suggest that this change may be explained by reference
to the ‘‘unconscionability’’ of allowing the debtor to ignore the notice of assignment by paying her creditor. That
proposition is discussed in Part V(C), infra.
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Suppose D owes L Ltd, an English-incorporated and domiciled company, £1,000 to be
repaid in two years’ time. Suppose also that the contract does not provide for any specific
place for payment. L Ltd equitably assigns the debt to X Ltd, and D is given express
notification of the assignment before the debt becomes due. But X Ltd has neither business
premises nor any agents located in England—it operates exclusively in Baghdad, Iraq. On
these extreme facts, it is difficult to deny that, if D can now discharge the debt only by
making payment to X Ltd in Baghdad, D’s obligations will have become much more
onerous than they had been at the time of contract.51
In principle, any change in the identity of the payee is far from trivial and, it is
submitted, ought not to be ignored. But where might that leave the ‘‘no discharge after
notice’’ rule? That proposition, seemingly so well entrenched in the cases and academic
literature, mandates that the effect of equitable assignment of the debt coupled with notice
is to change what is required for the debtor to fully discharge herself from her contractual
obligations. But why would such change not contravene the perfectly reasonable points
that Dr Tolhurst has made? If it is right to treat choses in action, such as a debt, as
‘‘property’’ that is capable of being ‘‘transferred’’, and that such ‘‘transfer’’ requires that
the transferee gets only what the transferor has, surely it must mean that either Dr
Tolhurst’s conception of ‘‘property’’ and ‘‘transfer’’ is wrong, or that there is some error
in the received wisdom as to the inability of a debtor to claim to have discharged her
obligation by making payment to her creditor, despite having had notice of an equitable
assignment of the debt. It seems they cannot both be right. To resolve the conundrum, it
would be helpful to re-examine: (i) how one effects an equitable assignment of a debt; (ii)
what is transferred when a debt is equitably assigned; and (iii) how equitable assignment
effects that transfer.
(i) How does one effect an equitable assignment?
When A borrows £1,000 from B and promises to repay that sum to B in 60 days’ time,
a legal relationship arises between A and B upon the formation of that contract. Should
the due date pass without payment of the stated sum to B, B will be entitled to bring an
action in debt at common law against A and will, in all likelihood, do so successfully.
First, the debt is a legal chose in action, being an obligation which would have been
enforced by action at law prior to the coming into force of the Judicature Act 1873.
Second, A’s debt to B is still a chose in action, although it is payable in futuro.52 Last,
since it arises out of a presently existing contract, the chose is a present or existing chose
in action (as opposed to a future chose in action).53 Absent the formalities set out in the
Law of Property Act 1925, s 136(1), any assignment by B to C of the debt will therefore
be an equitable assignment of a present chose in action.
Equity requires very little for such an assignment to be complete. First, the equitable
assignment of a legal chose in action vested in the assignor has the effect of creating an
51. At common law, it is the debtor’s duty to seek out his creditor and pay him the debt when due: Walton
v. Mascall (1844) 13 M & W 452, 458; 153 ER 188, 191. Where a place of payment is specified, however, it
is the duty of the creditor to attend at that place to receive payment: Robey v. Snaefell Mining Co (1887) 20 QBD
152; Thorn v. City Rice Mills (1888) 40 Ch D 357.
52. Kwok Chi Leung Karl v. Commissioner of Estate Duty [1988] 1 WLR 1035 (PC), 1040.
53. Norman v. Federal Taxation Commissioner (1963) 109 CLR 9, 26, per Windeyer J. See also Roxburghe
v. Cox (1881) 17 Ch D 520.
47NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT AND DISCHARGE BY PERFORMANCE
©I
nf
or
m
a 
nu
ll -
 1
7/
12
/2
01
8 
08
:4
3
‘‘equitable interest’’ in that chose in action distinct from that of the assignor. There is no
disposition of the assignor’s equitable interest, since, strictly speaking, he has none, prior
to the assignment.54 Therefore, the Law of Property Act 1925, s 53(1)(c), which would
have required the assignment to be in writing, does not apply. Second, notice to the
assignee is unnecessary for the equitable assignment to take effect as between assignor
and assignee (subject to the assignee’s right to disclaim a gift, if the assignment were
voluntary).55 Third, notice to the debtor is also unnecessary.56 Fourth, in our example,
since B’s equitable assignment to C is supported by valid consideration (being C’s release
of B’s indebtedness to him), we can leave aside the question whether consideration is
needed for an equitable assignment to be valid.57 For the equitable assignment to have
effect between the assignor, B, and the assignee, C, B merely needs to manifest his
intention immediately and irrevocably to assign the chose in action in question (ie, A’s
indebtedness to him) to C.
(ii) What does an equitable assignment transfer?
Reverting to our example involving A, B and C, supra, upon the formation of the contract
between A and B, B will have presently existing contractual rights against A, notwith-
standing that the time for A’s performance still lies in the future. It is submitted that in a
typically worded contract, B has at least three ‘‘rights’’ against A upon the formation58 of
the contract.59
First, B is entitled to sue A, ie, bring legal proceedings against A to contend that A is
in breach of the contract. This entitlement arises out of B’s standing as the contractual
54. Applying Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s analysis in Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v. Islington
London Borough Council [1996] AC 669, 706. Equitable assignments of a legal chose in action are, therefore,
‘‘non-dispositive’’. The same does not appear to be true in relation to equitable assignments of equitable choses
in action: Grey v. Inland Revenue Commissioners [1960] AC 1, 15–16. For a different view, see Tolhurst,
[7.29].
55. Standing v. Bowring (1885) 31 Ch D 282 (CA). Beyond English shores, see: Grey v. Australian Motorists
& General Insurance [1976] 1 NSWLR 669 (NSW CA), 673, per Glass JA, 676–679, per Samuels JA; Tsu Soo
Sin v. Oei Tijong Bin [2008] SGCA 46 (Sing CA), esp at [55]. See also the discussion of the point in Smith,
[7.72–7.75].
56. Fortescue v. Barnett (1834) 3 My & K 36, 42–43; 40 ER 14, 17; Donaldson v. Donaldson (1854) Kay,
711, 719; 69 ER 303, 307; Re Way’s Trust (1864) 2 De G J & Sm 365, 371–373; 46 ER 416, 418–419; Re Patrick
[1891] 1 Ch 82 (CA), 87; Walker v. The Bradford Old Bank Ltd (1884) 12 QBD 511; Ward v. Duncombe [1893]
AC 369, 392; Holt v. Heatherfield Trust Ltd [1942] 2 KB 1, 4. See also Smith, [7.76–7.77]; Marshall, 103;
Meagher, Gummow & Lehane, [6.435]. Cf Tolhurst, [4.19, 4.20 and 8.06], who takes a rather different view
(which is further discussed in Part V(C), infra).
57. The need for consideration in an equitable assignment of a chose in action is, ‘‘a matter of considerable
controversy’’: Smith, [7.78], and the references at n 119 therein. Smith, [7.82] takes the view that it is not
necessary. The position may, however, be otherwise where the thing assigned is not a presently existing chose
in action, but a future expectancy (such as future book debts). In such cases, the assignment will take effect in
equity if the assignment is supported by consideration when the book debts arise: Tailby v. Official Receiver
(1888) 13 App Cas 523.
58. As distinct from that point in time when the contract is breached.
59. For a much more detailed analysis of the concept of ‘‘ownership’’ of a chose in action, see WW Cook,
‘‘The Alienability of Choses in Action’’ (1916) 29 Harv L Rev 816, 819–821, where the terminology of
‘‘powers’’ used by WH Hohfeld, ‘‘Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions’’ (1913) 23 Yale LJ 16, and
‘‘privileges’’ is used in preference to ‘‘rights’’. Professor Cook also highlighted that the ‘‘owner’’ of a chose in
action should also possess ‘‘certain ‘legal immunities’ from the power of other persons to do acts which will, for
example, release or otherwise extinguish the rights above described’’.
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counterparty, and is derived from the fact that B is privy60 to the contract of debt entered
with A.61
Second, B has ‘‘self-help’’ rights, the most commonly available one being his right to
elect to discharge the contract should A either (i) anticipatorily repudiate it; (ii) actually
breach a condition of the contract; or (iii) actually breach an innominate term of the
contract, thereby causing B to lose substantially the entire benefit of the contract.62 Like
B’s right to bring an action against A, B’s right of election to discharge the contract for
breach is a presently existing right arising upon the formation of the contract of debt.63
Third, B may elect not to exercise either of the two rights set out above. B’s right to
bring legal proceedings to bear on A, or to elect to exercise some self-help remedy,
denotes that B has a right to elect not to take either step at all. This is most obvious in a
case where A has committed an anticipatory repudiatory breach of her obligations, since
the commission of such a breach does not automatically bring about legal action. B may
elect to discharge the contract in the face of such anticipatory breach, and then elect to
bring legal proceedings for that breach. B is not required to make either of these elections.
Disregarding the assignment to C, B has a free hand in choosing which, if any, election
he will make. So, in certain cases, an obligee (for example, a creditor) faced with an
anticipatory repudiatory breach by his obligor (the debtor) may well elect not immediately
to discharge the contract, but to wait and see what happens when actual performance is
due (ie, where the obligee chooses to affirm the contract). Or, the obligee may elect to
‘‘accept’’ the breach so as to discharge the contract, but then to elect not to bring any legal
proceedings at all (eg, where the obligee’s own counter-promises are entirely executory
and where there is no significant loss caused by the obligor’s non-performance). This right
not to bring legal proceedings or to exercise such self-help remedies as might be available
to the obligee is important: for, in electing not to exercise them, the obligee is, in effect,
releasing the obligor from her obligations under the contract.64
Therefore, upon the formation of any contract, unless the contract provides otherwise
on its true construction, an obligee obtains at least65 the following ‘‘rights’’:
(i) to sue the obligor;
(ii) to exercise any self-help remedies that may be available; and
(iii) to release the obligor from her contract obligations.
60. For ease of exposition, the varied and numerous ‘‘exceptions’’ to the doctrine of privity of contract are
disregarded within this Part.
61. Whether B succeeds in such action, though, is another matter.
62. In other contexts, other self-help rights might include the exercise of a lien over the obligee’s goods which
are in the obligor’s possession; though that would not be pertinent in cases like the present, where the subject
matter of the assignment is an intangible chose.
63. Whether it may have been lawfully exercised, though, depends on the contingency of breach. But that,
too, is another matter.
64. Such release may be granted voluntarily (in which case it must be by way of deed), or it may be granted
in exchange for valid consideration—in which case we shall have moved into the realm of discharge by accord
and satisfaction.
65. Apart from these three, the contract may provide for more—eg, a contractual right to terminate the
contract, a contractual right to have any dispute pertaining to the contract submitted for arbitration, and so forth.
It is suggested that the three mentioned in the main text are the ‘‘core’’ rights which should be present in most
contracts.
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Having identified what it is that B has, it becomes clear what it is that C gets, in principle,
when C is equitably assigned66 B’s legal rights in the debt owed by A: these selfsame
‘‘rights’’.67 But even if C has, in some sense, been transferred B’s legal rights, just what
it is that C is entitled to insist that A do is another question altogether.68
Keeping in mind the distinction between the question as to whom the debtor is liable,
and the question as to what the debtor is liable to do, and given that the latter question is
determined by comparing what A has done or will do (or what she has left undone or will
refuse to do), in comparison with what the contract’s terms prescribe, it becomes obvious
that, if the contract’s terms provide that A is to pay the sum owing ‘‘to B’’, the transfer
to C of B’s legal rights as against A has no effect on the content of those rights. The
‘‘transfer’’ only affects the question as to whom A is liable. It cannot affect what A is liable
to do under the terms of her contract with B, unless that contract, on a true construction
of its terms, is found to have made provision otherwise. This conclusion is reinforced by
considering how an equitable assignment effects such a transfer.
(iii) How does an equitable assignment effect a transfer?
In connection with trusts of land, Hackney observed as follows:69
‘‘The trustee has a legal title and access to common law courts and remedies, but he is a driven
vehicle for the superior rights of his beneficiary. He litigates at common law in response to his
equitable duties, and not to his common law rights, which have been subordinated. The trustee is
now a manager in an institution which is a hybrid between the creation of an agency and the
disposition of property’’.
Precisely the same thing occurs when a contractual obligee effects an equitable
assignment of the legal chose in action to an assignee. The first English edition of Story’s
Commentaries of Equity Jurisprudence states:70
‘‘[Courts of equity] give effect to assignments of trusts, and possibilities of trusts, and contingent
interests, and expectancies, whether they are in real or in personal estate, as well as to assignments
of choses in action. Every such assignment is considered in equity, as in its nature amounting to a
66. The position is the same in relation to statutory assignments. See Part VIII(B), infra.
67. Whether they do so, or not, will depend on what the parties intend to pass by way of the assignment.
Eg, given that the right to exercise the self-help remedy of discharge for breach really pertains to the issue of
discharge of the outstanding obligations of A and B under their contract, it is suggested that it does not invariably
follow that B and C would have intended for B to exercise such right of election to release itself from such
outstanding obligations under the contract only where to do so would be for C’s benefit since, given the usual
understanding that one may only assign contractual benefits, B’s contractual obligations to A, if any, may not be
assigned to C without A’s assent.
68. In a case where B effects an assignment of his legal rights in the debts owed by A to C after A has
breached the contract, the analysis is similar—the only difference being that A may no longer discharge her
obligations by precise performance. C’s position in such a case is thus, to some extent, more secure.
69. J Hackney, Understanding Equity and Trusts (London, 1987), 21–22. For a rather more lengthy
explanation to approximately the same ends, see B McFarlane, The Structure of Property Law (Oxford, 2008),
70–71.
70. WE Grigsby, Story’s Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence—First English Edition (London, 1884),
§ 1040 (references omitted).
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declaration of trust and to an agreement to permit the assignee to make use of the name of the
assignor, in order to recover the debt, or to reduce the property into possession’’.
Yet, if the equitable assignor is to be treated as the ‘‘trustee’’ of the chose in action for the
benefit of the assignee, that does not make the assignee the ‘‘owner’’ of the chose in
action.71 To borrow Maitland’s words, ‘‘Equity did not say that the [equitable assignee]
was the owner of the [legal rights to the debt], it said that the [equitable assignor] was the
owner of the [legal rights to the debt], but added that he was bound to hold the [legal rights
to the debt] for the benefit of the [equitable assignee]’’.72
This view as to what equitable proprietary interests entail seems not to have been fully
explored by Dr Tolhurst, leading him to suggest that:73
‘‘once the obligor receives notice, then, although the obligor can no longer ignore the interest of the
assignee, it may not be clear whether the assignee or the assignor can provide it with a valid
discharge. This results from the obligor owing its duty in part to both the assignee and assignor;
although that position existed prior to notice (the assignment being complete without notice), the
obligor did not have to consider the assignee until notice was given and, once given, the doctrinal
result was that the obligation was owed in law and equity to different people’’.
The better analysis may rather be that the debtor only ever owes a duty (at common law)
to the creditor; but, following the equitable assignment, the creditor is no longer in a
position to exercise his strict legal rights vis-a`-vis the debtor for his own benefit.
Just as a trustee who constitutes a trust over Blackacre cannot change the nature of
Blackacre by virtue of the trust’s constitution, so too the trustee who constitutes a trust
over a chose in action. If so, it follows that an equitable assignor may not, by virtue of the
assignment, change the nature of the chose in action assigned either.74 The true legal
position must be that A is discharged from her obligation to pay B once she pays B. B’s
equitable assignment of the debt to C is neither here nor there. It is a matter between B
and C and is none of A’s concern, unless she chooses to make it so.75
But what of notice?
71. See Part IV, supra.
72. Paraphrasing the analysis in the extract at text to n 44, supra.
73. Tolhurst, [8.06].
74. This was recently acknowledged to be the case by the Court of Appeal in Crooks v. Newdigate Properties
Ltd (formerly UPUK Ltd) and Ors [2009] EWCA Civ 283, albeit in a slightly different context. In that case, an
action in tort had been brought against a number of joint tortfeasors, of whom the third defendant was one
Grogan. Default judgment in the sum of £253,304.25 was obtained against him. The judgment creditor then
agreed, in a settlement agreement, to assign the benefit of this judgment debt to the second defendant upon the
receipt of a sum of £293,000 forwarded by the other defendants to the claim, other than Grogan. In deciding that
receipt of the settlement sum had the effect of extinguishing Grogan’s liability on his judgment debt, in one of
two alternative grounds for their decision, the Court of Appeal noted (at [22]) that, ‘‘the assignment of a debt
does not change the character of the debt. Mr Grogan remained liable after the assignment as he was before,
under a judgment in respect of a joint liability in tort. [But p]ayments by the other joint tortfeasors necessarily
reduced or extinguished Mr Grogan’s liability. The assignee can in this respect be in no better position than the
assignor. An assignment of a debt, including a judgment debt, is subject to equities, including the right of the
debtor to raise defences to enforcement arising out of the subject matter of the assignment. This includes the right
to require credit to be given for any sum paid in or towards satisfaction of the underlying liability. This would
be so even if the payments were made not only after the assignment but after notice of the assignment had been
given to the debtor.’’
75. See Part VI, infra.
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C. Notice and unconscionability
Dr Tolhurst takes a broad view of the effect of notice within the context of equitable
assignments:76
‘‘Generally, until the obligor receives notice of the assignment, it can obtain a good discharge from
the assignor. In the case of a legal [ie, statutory] assignment this must follow because until notice
is given there is no assignment. The position is the same with an equitable assignment because, until
the obligor receives notice of the assignment, its conscience is not bound by the assignment. It also
follows . . . that upon receiving notice of an assignment the obligor is bound in conscience to
perform the relevant obligation for the benefit of the assignee’’.
In response, one might make the following observations.
First, it is unclear why it would be unconscionable for a debtor, A, to insist on making
payment to her contractually stipulated creditor, B, after having been notified of an
equitable assignment to C. A commits no legal wrong in rendering payment to B, but is
merely fulfilling her legal obligation which predates the creation of C’s equitable interest
in that obligation. Indeed, given that it is A’s contractual duty to seek out her creditor77
to effect payment, how is this supposed unilateral change in the identity of her payee not
unconscionable vis-a`-vis A? Where the contract of debt provides that A is to pay B, and
where C has agreed to the assignment of B’s rights to that debt, how is it not at least
equally true to say that it would be ‘‘unconscionable’’ for C to insist that A is to do
something quite different, namely, pay C, when C knew very well that A was to pay B?
So far as case authority is concerned, there appears to be no English authority directly on
point;78 so, with respect, it would seem that, short of any active collusion between A and
B with intent to defraud C,79 it may be that the scales of unconscionability are evenly
balanced.
Second, even if it is right to treat A’s fulfilment of her contractual obligation as being
somehow ‘‘unconscionable’’, C might not have any equitable remedy to prevent A from
carrying out her wish to honour her legal obligations. Where A has paid B, it would be
too late for C to enjoin A—the deed is done, and the legal chose in action is no more as
it has already been discharged automatically by A’s precise performance of her
contractually stipulated obligation.80 A’s position is utterly distinct from that of the
purchaser of a legal estate in Blackacre who is seeking to resist the countervailing claims
76. Tolhurst, [8.06] (emphasis added).
77. As pointed out at n 51, supra.
78. There is some glancing Australian authority: see Tooth v. Brisbane City Council (1928) 41 CLR 212, 222,
per Isaacs J (the sole dissenting judge). The point has been cited with approval in a few other Australian
decisions since then, eg, Re Domenick Tony Palumbo and Sharon Rose Palumbo [1991] FCA 241, [36]; and
Clyne v. Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [1981] HCA 40; (1981) 150 CLR 1, [11]. However, none of these
cases involves a debt arising from a contractual promise of payment.
79. It may be that, where the debtor effects payment to the assignor-creditor as part of a scheme to defraud
the assignee (for example, where the debtor knows that the assignor-creditor will abscond with the funds, once
paid), accessory liability might conceivably be imposed on the debtor by way of the equitable doctrine of
knowing assistance, given the debtor’s ‘‘dishonesty’’ in making payment to the assignor-creditor. This may be
the unstated rationale underlying the decision of Eyre CJ in Legh v. Legh (1799) 1 Bos & P 447; 126 ER
1002.
80. An analogy might be drawn with the unpaid vendor’s possessory lien. Such a lien is, undoubtedly, a
proprietary interest. But it is extinguished once possession is lost: so, too, an equitable interest in a debt. Once
the debt is paid, the equitable interest in that debt is extinguished (although a claim might be made for the
traceable substitutes for that debt: see Part X, infra).
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to Blackacre by a trust beneficiary on the basis that he is Equity’s darling, ie, that he had
purchased the legal title to Blackacre bona fide without notice of the beneficiary’s
equitable interest in Blackacre. By making payment to B, A purchases nothing. She is
merely discharging her contractual obligation, and gains no property interest in anything
whatsoever, least of all anything to which C, as equitable assignee, has any claim.81 If
there is anything that the assignee has an equitable interest in, it can only be an equitable
interest in the traceable substitute of the assignor’s legal rights to the debt—ie, the monies
received by the assignor from the debtor, in precise performance of her contractual
obligation.82 Indeed, as du Parcq LJ noted in Re Schebsman,83 albeit in a slightly different
context as to whether a trust of a chose in action had been constituted over a contractual
promise by an employer to make payments to the widow and child of one of its
employees, there was, ‘‘no instance in which equity compels a man to pay money to
someone other than the person to whom alone, and for whose sole benefit, he has bound
himself to pay it’’. The position was, therefore, the same in equity as it was in law.84
Third, C, as transferee, gains no more than what B, the assignor, had (or could have
had). Had there been no assignment, B could never have been contractually entitled to
direct A to make payment to anyone else apart from himself such that A would be in
breach of her obligations were she to refuse to comply with such demand (absent express
81. Even if it is right to say that an obligee to a chose in action is entitled to the performance of the obligations
in that chose, it must be remembered that the chose only exists as a thing in action. The chose has no independent
existence outside of the potentiality of its realisation by way of an action in judicial proceedings.
82. This point was not brought to the attention of the Privy Council in Colonial Mutual Insurance v. ANZ
Banking Group [1995] 1 WLR 1140, or so it seems. Mr and Mrs Whittall owned a house, of which ANZ Banking
Group were second mortgagees. Pursuant to the New Zealand Property Law Act, s 78, the mortgage contained
an implied covenant that the Whittalls would insure the house in the name of the mortgagees. In breach of the
covenant, a policy of insurance was entered into with Colonial Mutual Insurance in Mr Whittall’s sole name,
although it noted the first mortgagees’ interest in ‘‘the insurance’’ as mortgagees of the house. Subsequently, the
second mortgagees notified the insurers of their interest, and their interest in ‘‘the insurance’’ was also noted. The
house was subsequently destroyed by fire. The first mortgagees exercised their power of sale and managed to
recover a sum sufficient to discharge the Whittalls’ indebtedness to them, turning over the excess amount
recovered to the second mortgagees. Even so, there remained some NZ$73,000 outstanding, and to satisfy this,
the second mortgagees looked to the sum payable on the insurance policy. The question was whether, in paying
that sum to Mr Whittall, the insurers had discharged their obligations under the policy of insurance; or whether
they were to pay that sum again to the second mortgagees. The New Zealand Court of Appeal ordered the latter.
In the opinion of the Privy Council, a charge by way of equitable assignment had been created over the proceeds
of the policy of which the insurers had received notice, and in consequence the decision of the court below ought
to be upheld. This is somewhat odd, at least by English standards. Even accepting that the proceeds of the policy
amounted to a debt, a charge over a debt merely confers upon the chargee the right to have the debt enforced,
‘‘not by action against the debtor, but by proceedings against the party who created the charge to assign the
debt’’: Burlinson v. Hall (1884) 12 QBD 347, 350, per Day J. This is only logical, since the charge was created
over the ‘‘proceeds’’ of the policy, that is, such sums as had been received by Mr Whittall. Prior to receipt, there
were no ‘‘proceeds’’, only the chose in action on the policy. See also the discussion in Part X, infra. As to
whether a charge operates ‘‘by way of assignment’’ at all, see Tolhurst, [3.17].
83. [1944] Ch 83 (CA), 104. Lord Greene MR also made similar observations, at 93. Putting the point beyond
doubt, both Lord Greene MR and du Parcq LJ (at 90 and 104 respectively) also proceeded to dismiss any
possibility of recovery against the deceased employee’s wife and children of monies paid to them by the
employer on the basis of money had and received, noting that it had been rightly conceded by counsel for the
parties that no such common law action could be brought.
84. Counsel for the trustee-in-bankruptcy had conceded, rightly, as Luxmoore LJ noted (Re Schebsman, ibid,
99), that at common law the employer in that case was entitled to make the payments to the widow and child
as it had contracted to do.
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or implied terms to that effect). Rather, A would be entitled to ignore B’s demand. If so,
how is it that C, as assignee, is in any different position?85
Fourth, this is not a case that involves application of the rule whereby notice inoculates
the assignee from equities as between the assignor and the debtor arising post-notice (ie,
the rule as to equities). Where A has precisely performed, her plea of such performance
is not, when closely examined, an equity as against her creditor as amounts to a defence
in the same manner as, say, a set-off.86 Rather, the plea of payment (ie, precise
performance) is a refutation of the claimant’s cause of action,87 whether that claimant be
the creditor-assignor, or his assignee.
In the slightly different context of mitigation and its (ir)relevance to an innocent party’s
right to affirm a contract following the other party’s breach of a condition, Lord Hodson
observed in White & Carter (Councils) Ltd v. McGregor that:88
‘‘[I]t may be unfortunate that the [garage company] have saddled themselves with an unwanted
contract causing an apparent waste of time and money . . .  [But] there is no equity which can assist
the [garage company]. It is trite that equity will not rewrite an improvident contract where there is
no disability on either side. There is no duty laid upon a party to a subsisting contract to vary it at
the behest of the other party so as to deprive himself of the benefit given to him by the contract. To
hold otherwise would be to introduce a novel equitable doctrine that a party was not to be held to
his contract unless the court in a given instance thought it reasonable to do so’’.
Yet this is precisely what the supposed rule as to notice of equitable assignment of a debt
is said to do to the debtor’s obligation to make payment to the named creditor. Surely that
ought not to be the case?
On the analysis in this paper, being notified of an equitable assignment does not
necessarily affect the manner in which the debtor is to be discharged from her obligation
of payment. Notices of assignment are, essentially, unilateral communications or
directives. Without assent and consideration,89 there is nothing within the common law
that gives such unilateral directives any coercive force so as to compel the debtor to act
in compliance with them. Nor is there anything within Equity pertaining to equitable
assignment or of notices per se which give them mandatory effect. In so far as the debt
arises out of a contractual chose in action, the debtor may choose to ignore such notices
85. See text at and following n 50.
86. Notwithstanding that ‘‘[t]he distinction between payment and set-off was often a very fine one in old
days’’ (Hewlett v. Allen [1894] AC 383, 389, per Lord Herschell LC), as the Court of Appeal held in Ribblesdale
v. Forbes (1916) 140 LT 483, a set-off is not equivalent to payment or accord and satisfaction. See also Halsbury
(London, 1999), vol 42, [410].
87. The plea of payment goes beyond a mere traverse of the claimant’s claim. It is a plea by way of confession
and avoidance. If the defendant successfully proves the new fact pleaded—that she has effected payment in
precise conformity with the contractual requirements—she destroys or nullifies the claimant’s case. ‘‘Where
there has been payment, the party against whom the claim is brought pleads payment or accord and satisfaction,
which in effect alleges that the claim no longer exists’’: Halsbury, (London, 1999), vol 42, [410]. Parke B noted
much the same in the course of counsel’s submissions in Kington v. Kington (1843) 11 M & W 233, 234–235;
152 ER 789 (‘‘In the case of a covenant to pay money on a particular day, payment on that day is a denial of
the breach . . . ’’). See also Chambers v. Miller (1862) 13 CB (NS) 125, 134–135; 143 ER 50, 53–54.
88. [1962] AC 413, 445.
89. Or a consideration substitute.
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if it suits her to do so.90 Conversely, the debtor may choose to give such notices legal
effect so as to vary her legal obligation, thereby effecting a discharge of her obligation in
an alternative manner by paying the assignee. This is explored in the following Part.
VI. DISCHARGE BY PAYING THE EQUITABLE ASSIGNEE
On the analysis in this paper, where a debtor is notified by her creditor91 that the debt has
been equitably assigned to the assignee, should the debtor choose to act upon such notice
and effect payment to the assignee, it might seem that the debtor would be exposed to a
different risk of double liability—this time, to her original creditor. To allow a creditor, B,
to assert that the debtor, A, had failed to precisely perform her contractual obligation to
make payment to B when she had made payment to the equitable assignee, C, in reliance
on the notice of assignment given to her by either B or C (on the authority of B) is contrary
to common sense. But immediately, one can see that B must, at the very least, be estopped
from being able to make any such claim against A.92 Yet the effect of such payment may
go beyond estoppel.
A. Cases where the contract provides for unilateral variation
The point has already been made that equitable assignment, notice or no, can have no
effect on what is required to permit the debtor to be discharged from her obligation under
her contract with her creditor. But it is certainly conceivable that the debtor’s contract with
her creditor may incorporate more than one mode of performance, and such provisions
may well be express or implied.
90. The case of a lessor’s obligation to pay rent raises different concerns. ‘‘[Rent] is a thing not merely in
action, because it may be granted over’’: Co Litt 292b. Consequently, ‘‘[a]ll rents were regarded as a species of
property, which took them out of the category of mere choses in action, and therefore out of the rule that there
could be no assignment of a chose in action. A rent reserved on a freehold estate was part of the reversion on
that estate. Naturally it could be assigned with that reversion’’: Sir William Holdsworth, A History of English
Law, vol VII, 2nd edn (London, 1937), 264–265 (references omitted). The entitlement to be paid rent has
therefore long been ‘‘assignable’’ in the sense that it would ‘‘run’’ with the reversion: Read v. Lawnse (1562) Dy
212b; 73 ER 469. See also Co Litt 151b. That position has been statutorily preserved by the Landlord and Tenant
(Covenants) Act 1995, s 3 (which applies to ‘‘new tenancies’’, as defined in s 1(3) of the 1995 Act being, in
general, leases granted on or after 1 January 1996), or the Law of Property Act 1925, s 141 (which applies to
tenancies other than ‘‘new tenancies’’). Furthermore, unless the lease provides otherwise, the lessor is usually
free to assign the reversion, following which there will be privity of estate between the ‘‘new’’ landlord and the
lessee, as a result of which the lessee is bound to pay rent to the new landlord. The position of a tenant who is
notified that the reversion has been assigned to a ‘‘new’’ landlord is, therefore, not the same as the position of
a debtor who has promised to pay a certain sum on a certain day to her creditor. ‘‘[I]f the lessee grants over all
his interest, the lessor may have an action of debt against the assignee, with whom there was no contract by deed.
But, forasmuch as the rent issues out of the land, the assignee who hath the land and is privy in estate, is debtor
in respect to the land . . .  So on the other side if the lessor grants over his reversion, now the contract runneth
with the estate, and therefore the grantor shall not have any action for debt for rent due after his assignment, but
the grantee shall have it, for the privity of contract follows the estate of the land, and it is not annexed to the
person, but in respect of the estate . . . ’’: Walker’s Case (1587) 3 Co Rep 22a, 22b; 76 ER 676, 678–679.
91. Where the notice is provided by the equitable assignee, its effectiveness must surely be on the basis that
the assignee was issuing the notice on behalf of the creditor-assignor.
92. As Sir William Anson observed in 1901: WR Anson, ‘‘Assignment of Choses in Action’’ (1901) 17 LQR
90, 94. Certainly, all the elements of promissory estoppel are to hand.
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One example of such a contract with a relevant implied term may be found in Tolhurst
v. Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers (1900) Ltd.93 Although often cited as an
example of equitable assignment, the leading speech, delivered by Lord Macnaghten,94 is
plainly based on something else. In that case, the respondent corporation had taken an
equitable assignment of the contractual rights enjoyed by the assignor to the sale and
delivery of chalk extracted from a mine owned and operated by the appellant obligor. Yet
in holding that the appellant was not entitled to claim that his contractual obligation of
delivery of chalk at the contractually stipulated price and at the minimum quantities
specified therein had not terminated with the winding-up of the named counterparty
therein, Lord Macnaghten relied on a legal principle that had nothing to do with the
doctrine of equitable assignment per se.
Taking into consideration the commercial context leading to the formation of the
contract,95 Lord Macnaghten resolved the difficulty as to whether the obligor mine-owner
was liable to honour its contractual obligations to sell the assignees such quantities of
chalk at such prices as were specified in his contract with the obligee-assignor in the
following manner:96
‘‘Something more is comprehended than the particular company [the obligee-assignor] and the
individual Tolhurst [the appellant-obligor]. It seems to me that the contract is to be read and
construed as if it contained an interpretation clause saying that the expression ‘Tolhurst’ should
include Tolhurst and his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, owners and occupiers of the
Northfleet quarries. And the expression ‘the company’ should include the company and its
successors and assigns, owners and occupiers of the Northfleet Cement Works, and that the words
‘his’ and ‘their’ should have a corresponding meaning. That, I think, was the plain intention of the
parties’’.
Therefore, the significance of the equitable assignment of the chose in action in
Portland Cement from the original obligee-assignor to the assignee corporation was only
to clothe the assignee with the appropriate characteristics as to fall within the scope of the
terms of the contract, construed in the expansive manner put forward by the court. The
principle of equitable assignment was not relied upon to explain the ultimate decision
arrived at by the House of Lords, at least so far as the majority was concerned.
Given the analysis favoured here, highlighting the common law rule as to invariability
of a common law obligation once agreed upon and crystallised in the form of contractual
terms, the House could not have come to any other conclusion; and that proposition is
reinforced by the analysis below as to how the defence of tender may be seen to operate.
To explain how there can be, in effect, a variation of the debtor’s obligation (as to the party
to whom payment or tender of payment is to be made), a common law explanation is
93. [1903] AC 414 (hereafter ‘‘Portland Cement’’). For a different reading, see Tolhurst, [6.121].
94. With whom the Earl of Halsbury LC reluctantly agreed: [1903] AC 414, 416). Lord Shand was unable to
deliver his own speech. However, Lord Macnaghten was deputised to confirm that Lord Shand concurred with
him (at 421). Lord Lindley delivered a short speech which adopted a broadly similar approach to that taken by
Lord Macnaghten: see esp 423.
95. [1903] AC 414, 419.
96. Ibid, 420.
56 LLOYD’S MARITIME AND COMMERCIAL LAW QUARTERLY
©I
nf
or
m
a 
nu
ll -
 1
7/
12
/2
01
8 
08
:4
3
required. And one common law explanation97 may lie in the court’s willingness either to
construe express terms in the contract in an expansive manner (to include parties clothed
with the character of ‘‘assignees’’, as in Portland Cement, even if there is no express
mention of them) or, perhaps, to imply such a term, if the facts of the case merit it, if it
is not possible to discern facts consistent with assent to the variation having been sought
from and granted by the debtor/obligor.98
B. Cases without provision for unilateral variation
What of cases with neither express nor implied provision for such seeming ‘‘unilateral
variation’’? In such cases, notice may be relevant as constituting either a unilateral or a
bilateral offer of variation of the contract that becomes binding only upon its acceptance
by the debtor/obligor.
Where A is indebted to B, it is plain that, should A make payment to B in full
compliance with the terms of her contractual debt to B, her contractual obligation will be
discharged without any act of assent by B—there is no question of any ‘‘grant’’ of
discharge by B (much less B’s assignees). But this is not the only mode by which the
obligation may be discharged. In a simple case where A is indebted to B on the basis of
a contract of loan, it is perfectly conceivable that A might be ‘‘released’’ or ‘‘discharged’’
from her obligation to pay B simply by B’s waiver of the term requiring payment. In such
cases, the problem often becomes whether B’s waiver is binding so as to preclude him
from unilaterally resiling from it and insisting that A revert to honouring her obligations
as per the original terms of the contract.
It has been said that:99
‘‘[a] concession granted by one party (B) to the contract to the other (A) before breach and supported
by consideration or in the form of a deed will, subject to any requirement of writing, constitute an
effective variation. A similar concession after breach constitutes an accord and satisfaction or
release’’.
So, if the debt is as yet not due because B has not disbursed the loan monies to A, the
obligations of the contract of loan between A and B will still be executory. In such a case,
A and B may vary the terms of their original contract of loan by mutually agreeing not to
insist that the other perform its as-yet-executory obligation. But, where B has already
performed his obligation to put A in funds, it is still possible for A and B to agree to bring
97. In other cases, where the contract provides that assignment thereof is conditional upon the obtaining of
consent from the obligee, one other common law solution would be to disregard the literal language of
assignment and view the mechanism for transfer as being a form of novation, where the consent of the obligee
to the ‘‘assignment’’ functions as the obligee’s assent to a novation of the contractual benefits and its burdens
to the ‘‘assignee’’. This was how the Court of Appeal viewed the arrangements in British Gas Trading Ltd v.
Eastern Electricity Plc [1996] EWCA Civ 1239 and is discussed in J Kirby, ‘‘Assignments and Transfers of
Contractual Duties: Integrating Theory and Practice’’ (2000) 31 VUWLR 317, 342–343.
98. It appears that this was how Scots law comprehended assignment (or assignation as it is also termed in
Scots law): WM Gloag, The Law of Contract: A treatise on the principles of contract in the law of Scotland, 2nd
edn (Edinburgh, 1929), 257. Indeed, such an agreement by an obligor to perform her obligations to such entity
as might eventually be nominated as some future date by the obligee might also be taken to be a form of
novation, where the agreement of obligor to such novation is obtained in advance, at the time of the formation
of the contract, rather than at the time of the substitution of the counterparty: see Kirby (2000) 31 VUWLR 317,
345–348.
99. Halsbury (London, 1998), vol 9(1), [1027].
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their loan agreement to an end and to release A from her obligations under that agreement
so long as A provides fresh consideration to ‘‘purchase’’ B’s release of those—ie, a case
of discharge by ‘‘accord and satisfaction’’ if the debt is already due, or a case of discharge
by variation if it is not. And, if B executes a deed releasing A from the debt, that release
is binding on B even absent any consideration from A.100 If B had assigned the debt to C,
given that the entire purpose of assignment would be to entitle B’s assignee, C, to demand
payment by A, it is difficult to see how such arrangements entered into by B with A can
be anything other than for C’s benefit and are therefore within the scope of B’s limited
autonomy in his dealings with the chose in action if B had equitably assigned his legal
rights to the debt to C at an earlier point in time.
As to what might amount to good consideration for the purposes of discharge by
variation or accord and satisfaction, though there are some special concerns that are
applicable in relation to a debt obligation,101 the usual rules apply.102 Which is to say, in
general, and apart from the case of a promise to pay a lesser sum than is already owed
under the contract of debt,103 most other promises when performed will amount to good
executory consideration. If we accept the proposition in this paper, that the identity of the
creditor to whom the loaned moneys are to be repaid is as much a term of the contract as
the time or place when such debt is due for payment and is therefore similarly invariable,
surely payment to someone other than that creditor must amount to good consideration?
Should that be the satisfaction required of an accord or variation between the debtor and
the creditor so as to release the debtor from having to pay to the creditor, then such paid-
for release is legally effective and binding. None of this should be contentious. Even if it
were, there is certainly authority to support the proposition that, where a third party is paid
by the debtor at the direction of the creditor, such facts may support a pleading of
discharge of the original debt obligation by accord and satisfaction.104 The analogy
between that case and this would seem tolerably close.
Where A communicates her acceptance of a bilateral offer of variation by B, or where
A makes payment to C, an equitable assignee from B, A has not been discharged from her
obligation to make payment to B by precise performance, since A has performed
something other than what the contract specified. Only by interpolating the doctrine of
waiver105 may we conclude that A is relieved from her obligation under the terms of the
original contract of debt with B by paying C at B’s request. In this, the law of assignment
(whether in equity or pursuant to statute) adds nothing. However, notice is significant
because it constitutes the offer of variation that presents the opportunity for A’s
obligations to be modified.
Thus, notice to A simply constitutes a fresh offer to discharge A from her obligation to
pay B, if she agrees to pay C. A’s agreement, signified by performing the very act
100. Preston v. Christmas (1759) 2 Wils KB 86; 95 ER 700.
101. See Halsbury, (London, 1998), vol 9(1), [1045].
102. See Halsbury (London, 1998), vol 9(1), [1045] (as to accord & satisfaction) and [1023] (as to
variation).
103. Which, from Pinnel’s Case (1602) 5 Co Rep 117a; 77 ER 237, is not good consideration at all.
104. Eg, Page v. Meek (1862) 32 LJ QB 4, 4–5.
105. Typically in the context of an equitable assignment, for consideration, so as to amount to an accord and
satisfaction or a contractual variation and, absent any express or implied term permitting unilateral changes in
the identity of the payee.
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requested in B’s offer,106 results in the formation of a contract of variation (or accord and
satisfaction) that binds A and B; and, under that contract, B is bound to insist no longer
that A make payment to B. Further, should the offer take a unilateral form, A need not
communicate her acceptance of such offer, but may accept by simply performing the act
requested of her. Last, as all of this occurs while the debtor’s original contractual
obligation remains outstanding, releasing A from having to pay B is good consideration
for A’s new obligation to pay C. So we are in perfect conformity with the common law
rule as to invariability of contractual obligations, unless there be assent by the obligor
supported by good consideration for such variation. It remains open, though, for the debtor
to reject such an offer, electing to make payment in precise conformity with the terms set
out in the contract with her creditor, instead.
C. Cases where the debtor has paid neither her creditor nor the assignee
One final permutation remains. That is, where the debtor has not made any payment at all,
to either statutory assignor or assignee; or, where she has indicated that she will not make
any payment to either party—ie, where the debtor is in actual or anticipatory breach. Here,
the key concept is that of merger.
Where the debtor is in actual breach, the equitable assignee is entitled to launch legal
proceedings against the debtor, albeit in the name of the assignor. As we know, the
assignee is entitled to name himself as co-claimant alongside the assignor, if the latter
wishes to cooperate, or as sole claimant, naming the assignor as co-defendant alongside
the debtor, if not. Should the action succeed, judgment will be ordered in favour of the
co-claimants or claimant as the case may be. In either case, once judgment is delivered,
should the court find that the debt is due and is unpaid, the assignee becomes a judgment
creditor, the debtor becomes a judgment debtor, and the chose in action, being the legal
right to bring a dispute for resolution before a common law court, will have been merged
with the judgment. There is no longer any concern as to whether the debtor is still obliged
to perform precisely according to the terms of her contract of debt, for, as a result of the
doctrine of merger, those obligations will have been superseded by her obligation to
comply with the terms of the court’s judgment.107
So much for principle; what of the cases?
VII. THE CASES: A FRESH LOOK
A. A case of (failed) set-off: Brice v. Bannister
We start with the case most commonly relied upon in support of the ‘‘no discharge after
notice’’ rule: Brice v. Bannister.108 There, Gough had been contracted to build a boat for
Bannister. He assigned sums as would be due from Bannister to Brice, and Bannister was
notified of the assignment. Fearful, however, that Gough would not be able to complete
106. B’s offer will, typically, be unilateral. But it is open to B to frame his offer of discharge as being bilateral.
If so, A’s acceptance will have to be communicated to B, typically in the form of a counter-promise to B to make
that payment to C, as requested.
107. Halsbury (London, 2001), vol 37, [1225].
108. (1878) 3 QBD 569.
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construction of the boat if he was not kept in funds, Bannister made payments to Gough
in advance of any sums accruing due on the boat-building contract. Brice sued Bannister
for the sums that were to have been paid on the contract, and succeeded.
The following passages of the judgments handed down in the Court of Appeal are
instructive. First, Cotton LJ noted ‘‘the advances were in no way sanctioned by the
contract’’.109 Second, Bramwell LJ restated Brice’s case to be: ‘‘You [Bannister] had no
right to pay in advance; you were bound to wait till the work was finished; you would then
owe Gough money, and would then be bound to pay me [Brice]’’.110
If Bannister had no right to make advances under the boat-building contract, as they
were not paid by way of gift, they must have been made by way of loan with the intention
that they be set off against the sums to be paid under the boat-building contract as those
fell due. However, once Gough’s right to receive sums from Bannister as would become
due and payable under the boat-building contract was assigned to Brice, there would no
longer be any mutuality between Gough’s obligation to repay any advances received from
Bannister and Bannister’s obligation to pay Gough as required under the boat-building
contract. By virtue of the assignment of the right to bring a claim on the debt (ie, the
staged payment for work done in building Bannister’s boat), it was no longer up to Gough
to make the decision as to whether to bring proceedings on the debt or not. It would then
be up to the assignee, ie Brice, to make that decision.111 There was thus no mutuality
between the two sets of debts (as that principle is defined in cases such as Re Whitehouse
& Co112 and Re Paraguassu Steam Tramroad Co; Black & Co’s Case.)113 Accordingly, it
was not open to the defendant debtor to rely on statutory set-off to discharge his obligation
to pay under the boat-building contract, the benefit of which had been assigned to the
assignee.
Nor could there be any substantive equitable set-off, since the debt owed by Gough
arising from the defendant’s advance payment did not ‘‘impeach’’ the title of the
claimant’s demand.114 There was no ‘‘impeachment’’ since the defendant’s advance
payment was distinct and separate from the debts arising due under the boat-building
contract—they were insufficiently interconnected.115
Brice v. Bannister ought, therefore, to be read as a case where neither statutory nor
equitable set-off was available to the defendant debtor owing to a lack of mutuality and
there being insufficient ‘‘interconnectedness’’ between the debts arising out of the advance
payments and the sums due on the boat-building contract.
109. Ibid, 578
110. Ibid, 581.
111. That is to say, Brice would have the equitable title to Gough’s chose in action (in respect of Bannister’s
debt, once it became due).
112. (1878) 9 Ch D 595, 597 (per Jessel MR).
113. (1872) LR 8 Ch App 254, 261 (per Lord Selborne LC, and with whom Sir WM James and Sir G Mellish
LJJ concurred).
114. R Derham, The Law of Set-off, 3rd edn (Oxford, 2003), [4.02–4.03], drawing on the authority of Rawson
v. Samuel (1841) Cr & Ph 161, 178–180; 41 ER 451, 458–459.
115. See, in particular, Brice v. Bannister (1878) 3 QBD 569, 581, per Bramwell LJ (who ultimately joined
Cotton LJ in holding that the defendant was obliged to pay the sum due on the boat-builder’s contract to the
assignee).
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B. A case of accord and satisfaction: Jones v. Farrell
In Jones v. Farrell,116 the firm of Farrell & Griffiths (‘‘Farrell’’) was contracted to build
Moore a factory. Farrell was also indebted to the firm of Jones, Bland & Co (‘‘Jones’’). To
obtain further credit, Farrell effected an equitable assignment by way of security to Jones
by preparing a written order addressed to Moore on the following terms:117
‘‘We desire you [Moore] to accept this order upon you for the sum of £1,000, and pay Messrs. Jones,
Bland & Co that sum or any less amount which may from time to time be owing by you to us.
. . . ’’.
The order was left in the hands of Jones, who subsequently presented it to Moore.118 On
receipt, Moore indorsed upon the order as follows: ‘‘I promise to pay to Messrs Jones,
Bland & Co whatever balance may be due from me to Messrs Farrell & Griffiths’’.
Lord Cranworth LC accepted that Farrell’s ‘‘order’’ to Moore amounted to an,
‘‘assignment . . .  to the extent of £1,000 of what should, from time to time, be due to them
from Moore in respect of the building they were making for him’’.119 And Moore
undeniably had notice of such assignment, given his indorsement on the very same
order.120 Despite the order and notice, however, Farrell subsequently sued for the balance
due from Moore for the work done on Moore’s factory building.121 Jones sought to enjoin
Farrell from prosecuting that action at law but, before that application came on for
hearing, Moore paid the sum on the account stated to Farrell. In response, Jones amended
its bill and prayed that Moore, Farrell, or such of them as the court saw fit, be ordered to
pay the money to it.
The amended bill was allowed by Lord Romilly MR at first instance as against Farrell,
but not against Moore. But by that time, the partners in Farrell were not good for the
money. Jones successfully appealed against the latter part of the decree and it was varied,
making Moore, as well as Farrell, responsible to pay the sum over to Jones. In effect,
Moore was to pay the sum over again, but this time to Jones. Although this appears to
support the ‘‘no discharge after notice’’ rule, initial appearances are deceiving.
(i) The ‘‘voluntary’’ payment in Jones v. Farrell
It is possible to view Farrell’s ‘‘order’’ to Moore as amounting to an offer to discharge the
original liability on the account stated for the building of Moore’s factory on an accord
and satisfaction by Moore making payment to Jones instead of to Farrell—an offer which
was accepted when Moore promised, at Farrell’s request, to pay Jones. Therefore, Jones
116. (1857) 1 De G & J 208; 44 ER 703.
117. (1857) 1 De G & J 208, 208–209; 44 ER 703, 704.
118. Admittedly, the capacity in which Jones did so is unclear. But it is not legally implausible that Farrell
had left these instructions with Jones for conveyance to Moore as his agent.
119. (1857) 1 De G & J 208, 216; 44 ER 703, 706. Knight Bruce LJ (with whom Turner LJ concurred) seems
also to have accepted that there was an equitable assignment from Farrell to Jones (at (1857) 1 De G & J 208,
222; 44 ER 703, 709)—though of what, it remains unclear.
120. (1857) 1 De G & J 208, 216 and 220; 44 ER 703, 707 and 708.
121. Found by the architect employed to settle the account to be £472, 8s.
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v. Farrell is a case of discharge by accord and satisfaction, wherein the satisfaction
provided by Moore took executory form.122
In what should be taken to be the leading judgment,123 Knight Bruce LJ reasoned that
Moore’s payment of the disputed sum to Farrell stood, ‘‘in the particular circumstances of
this case, upon no better footing merely voluntary’’.124 It will also be recalled that Moore
had provided a written undertaking that he would pay Jones.125 Although Lord Cranworth
LC had suggested that this promise to pay the sum to Jones might have no significant
impact on the outcome of the case,126 this promise to make payment was critical. For
Moore’s actual payment to Farrell could only be said to be no better than voluntary if the
debt for which it was to have been in satisfaction had been otherwise discharged. Which
is to say, implicit in its treatment of Moore’s payment as being no better than voluntary,
the majority must have found that the original obligation to pay had already been
discharged. Until there is satisfaction, there is no discharge. But as to what counts as
satisfaction, that is a matter of construction. And, ‘‘where it can be shown that what a
creditor accepts in satisfaction is merely his debtor’s promise, and not the performance of
that promise, the original cause of action is discharged from the date when the promise is
made’’.127
Once we recognise this, the point made by Knight-Bruce LJ, that Moore’s subsequent
payment to Farrell was as good as voluntary, becomes perfectly explicable. In taking that
view, Knight-Bruce LJ must have meant that the sum paid by Moore to Farrell was not
paid under any form of legal obligation to do so. Yet how could this be, given the account
stated by the architect appointed to settle the account in favour of Farrell? The reason must
have been that Moore’s promise to pay Jones, albeit executory, was good and valid
satisfaction so as to immediately make effective the accord reached between Moore and
Farrell, and thereby discharged that original obligation of payment on the account stated.
Hence, Moore’s subsequent payment stood, ‘‘on no better footing than merely voluntary’’.
This also explains why Jones was permitted to have the decree against Farrell varied, to
make both Farrell and Moore responsible to pay the sum in question over to Jones. The
122. Though early authority required that consideration to support an effective accord and satisfaction had to
be executed, by the time Jones came for decision, that position had been abandoned. In British Russian Gazette
and Trade Outlook Ltd v. Associated Newspapers Ltd [1933] 2 KB 616, 645, Scrutton LJ noted that this was
accepted by Parke B. in Good v. Cheesman (1831) 2 B & Ad 328, 335; 109 ER 1165 and by the Court of King’s
Bench in Cartwright v. Cooke (1832) 3 B & Ad 701, 703; 110 ER 256, 703.
123. Arguably, the leading judgment was that of Knight Bruce LJ. We may infer that Turner LJ agreed with
Knight-Bruce LJ and not with the much longer judgment of Lord Cranworth LC because the final form of the
decree ordered that costs at law be in favour of Moore, as proposed by Knight Bruce LJ ((1857) 1 De G & J 208,
222; 44 ER 703, 709), instead of the order that there be no order of costs as proposed by Lord Cranworth LC
(at (1857) 1 De G & J 221, 216; 44 ER 703, 708). The point is made barely more obviously, perhaps, in the report
of this decision at (1857) 3 Jur (NS) 751: at p 753, it reports that Knight Bruce LJ’s impression was that, ‘‘Mr
Moore ought to have the costs at law to be set off, subject to what the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Justice may
say. My impression is, that Mr Moore should have the costs at law; but that must depend upon their opinion’’.
The report then immediately records as follows: ‘‘Sir GJ Turner LJ concurred—Decree varied accordingly; costs
at law agreed at 5l’’.
124. (1857) 1 De G & J 208, 219; 44 ER 703, 709.
125. ‘‘Mr Moore not only had notice of the assignment, but he had (if that were necessary, which I do not say
it was) given a written undertaking that he would act upon that notice’’: (1857) 1 De G & J 208, 220; 44 ER 703,
708 (per Lord Cranworth LC).
126. Ibid.
127. Morris v. Baron [1918] AC 1, 35, per Lord Atkinson, citing in support the cases of Sibree v. Tripp (1846)
15 M & W 23; 153 ER 745; Hall v. Flockton (1851) 16 QB 1039; 117 ER 1179; and Evans v. Powis (1847) 1
Ex 601; 154 ER 255.
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reason why Moore had to ‘‘pay again’’ was not because he had paid Farrell following
notice of the assignment; and this conclusion is reinforced when we take into account the
subject matter of the assignment in Jones v. Farrell.
(ii) The subject matter of the assignment in Jones v. Farrell
The Court of Appeal was unanimous in finding that Farrell had effected an equitable
assignment to Jones. But of what precisely? Restating the steps in reasoning set out above,
we have the following.
First, by promising to pay Jones, Moore had accepted the offer of discharge of the
original debt obligation by means of an accord and satisfaction. That accord and
satisfaction took immediate effect once Moore communicated his acceptance of Farrell’s
offer, thereby promising Farrell that he would, indeed, pay Jones. Second, the original
debt obligation having been discharged by accord and satisfaction, the subject matter of
the assignment to Jones could not have been Farrell’s original right to receive payment of
the balance of the account stated in relation to Farrell’s work done in building Moore’s
factory. Given that the accord and satisfaction themselves constitute an enforceable and
binding contract, following discharge of the original obligation of payment, the only
subject matter capable of being assigned to Jones would have been Farrell’s right to insist
that Moore make payment to Jones. Third, this right having then been effectively assigned
to Jones, Jones was entitled to bring these proceedings against Moore on the basis of his
equitable interest over Farrell’s common law right to give Moore a discharge over his
obligation to make payment to Jones on the contractual promises forming the accord and
satisfaction which discharged the original payment obligation. Given the above, the fact
of Moore’s having made actual payment to Farrell was immaterial, notice of assignment
or no. That actual payment was voluntary and unrelated to any prior legal relationship
Moore might have had vis-a`-vis Farrell.
C. Cases where there was no payment to the creditor at all
The cases of Durham Brothers v. Robertson,128 Walter & Sullivan Ltd v. J Murphy & Sons
Ltd,129 William Brandt’s Sons & Co v. Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd,130 Yates v. Terry131 and Ex
p Nichols132 are also often cited as authority for the ‘‘no discharge after notice’’ rule. Yet
in none of these cases was the court concerned with the question of the application of the
doctrine of discharge by precise performance.
In Durham Brothers v. Robertson,133 the Court of Appeal held that an equitable
assignee134 was not entitled to bring legal proceedings against the debtor without joining
the assignor where the assignment had been effected by way of security only. Conse-
quently, the assignee’s action against the debtor failed, since the amount due from the
128. [1898] 1 QB 765 (CA).
129. [1955] 2 QB 584 (CA).
130. [1905] AC 454.
131. [1902] 1 KB 527 (CA).
132. (1883) 22 Ch D 782 (CA).
133. [1898] 1 QB 527 (CA).
134. Because the assignment was conditional and not absolute: ibid, 769, 773 and 774.
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equitable assignor to the assignee could not be ascertained.135 Further, an account taken in
an action brought between the assignee and the debtor would not have bound the
assignor.136 The court was not asked whether the debtor had been discharged from its
obligation to effect payment by precise performance on account of its having paid the
assignor, for nothing of the sort was in issue: in fact, the debtor disputed (ultimately
unsuccessfully) whether any sum was due to the assignor at all. So Durham Brothers
cannot be taken as authority in support of the ‘‘no discharge after notice’’ rule.
Walter & Sullivan Ltd v. J Murphy & Sons Ltd137 was concerned with the converse.
There, the Court of Appeal was asked whether an equitable assignor was entitled to bring
an action against the defendants for sums due for services rendered, without having to join
the assignees to whom the chose in action against the defendants had been equitably
assigned in part as security. In the court below, the assignor’s action was stayed, pending
joinder of the assignees. On appeal to the Court of Appeal, Parker LJ said:138
‘‘In the present case . . .  it is the assignor who is seeking to recover, and in his own right, and it is
strongly urged that he is entitled to do so without joining the assignee. We think that that is an
impossible contention. The whole object of the notice to the debtor is to protect the assignee. After
receipt of that notice the debtor pays the assignor at his peril’’.
The assertion of the ‘‘no discharge after notice’’ rule in Walter & Sullivan was merely
to justify the court’s conclusion that the court below had been right to stay the
proceedings, pending joinder (a decision which the Court of Appeal upheld). Walter &
Sullivan does not, therefore, provide independent authority for the ‘‘no discharge after
notice’’ rule, and on the analysis in this paper, it rests upon a false premise. The result
arrived at by the court is, nevertheless, entirely explicable: since, after effecting the
assignment, the assignor is only entitled to manage his legal rights to the debt for the
benefit of the assignee, the answer to the question whether the assignor was entitled to
bring the action in its own name, without joining the assignee, is plainly ‘‘no’’. That,
however, is not the same as holding that the assignor had had no entitlement to bring the
action at all, as would have been the case had a complete stranger attempted to bring an
action on the debt. By upholding the stay of proceedings ordered in the court below, the
appellate court must have implicitly accepted that the assignor was entitled to bring the
action, but could only proceed jointly with the assignee as co-claimant. In consequence,
the assignor was not entitled to judgment on the matter in its sole name:
‘‘It was further said that once the plaintiffs in the present proceedings recovered judgment the debt
would merge in the judgment debt, and that accordingly, the defendants could not thereafter be sued
by Hall & Co Ld [the equitable assignees]. The court, however, will not give judgment for the
plaintiffs when there is an admitted interest outstanding in Hall & Co Ld, and unless and until the
authority to pay Hall & Co Ld is withdrawn, or Hall & Co Ld are joined in the proceedings,
judgment cannot be given’’.139
Therefore, Walter & Sullivan was concerned with when the court would allow judgment
to be entered where a debt obligation had not been performed, and where the equitable
135. Ibid.
136. Ibid.
137. [1955] 2 QB 584 (CA).
138. Ibid, 588.
139. Ibid, 589.
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assignee had not been joined in the proceedings. It is not sound authority in support of the
‘‘no discharge after notice’’ rule at all.
The same is true of William Brandt’s Sons & Co v. Dunlop Rubber Co.140 In that case,
the House of Lords held that the debt owed by the Dunlop Rubber Company had been
equitably assigned, and due notice had been given.141 Lord Macnaghten observed that
nothing more could be required: ‘‘Dunlop disregard that notice, and pay the wrong people.
They must pay the money over again, and pay it to the right person’’.142 Because of the
error of its employees, the Dunlop Rubber Company had paid not the assignees, William
Brandt’s Sons & Co, as they had been directed to do via the notice of assignment, but had
paid another entity altogether, Kleinwort & Co, being the assignees of a prior, unrelated
debt. Obviously, a payment to neither the creditor nor the designated assignee of that debt
should be disregarded, therefore requiring the payor to pay again. So the question whether
a debtor was entitled to claim that it had discharged its obligation to effect payment by
having precisely performed its obligation under the contract never arose.
As for Yates v. Terry,143 the issue before the court was one as to competing priorities.
As executor of a company in liquidation, the defendant (A) had been found to be liable
to pay B the sum of £50 1s 6d, for salary and services. A was then served with a garnishee
summons in relation to a judgment for the sum of £37 18s 7d that X had obtained against
B in separate proceedings. Next, A was given notice that B had assigned to the claimant
(C) the sum of £16 17s 8d due to him from the defendant. Finally, A received a second
garnishee summons in relation to a judgment for the sum of £21 4s 7d that Y had obtained
against B in yet another set of proceedings. Obviously, A’s indebtedness to B was
insufficient to satisfy all of these competing claims. The issue was how priority was to be
accorded to each of them. A’s response had been to pay the entire sum of £50 1s 6d into
court. In consequence, the first garnishee summons was satisfied in full while the second
garnishee summons was satisfied in part, leaving the assignee with nothing. In effect, A
had ignored the fact that he had received notice of the assignment to C prior to his having
been served the second garnishee summons.
The Court of Appeal held that A ought only to have paid £37 18s 4d into court, in
compliance with the first garnishee order. Having done that, as Romer LJ noted,144 the
right to the balance would still remain ‘‘in the person who originally had the right to the
whole’’ (ie, in B); such right was capable of assignment, it was assigned, and notice was
given prior to the defendant’s receipt of the second garnishee summons. It followed
that:
‘‘there was a balance left in the hands of the defendant [A] bound by the assignment, and it was his
duty not to let the subsequent garnishee order pass without notice that the fund was not really that
of the judgment debtor, so that it could be attached, but that of an assignee. By breach of that
obligation the assignee [had] lost his money, and according to well-known principles the defendant
[was] liable for that loss’’.145
140. [1905] AC 454.
141. Ibid, 460.
142. Ibid, 461 (emphasis added).
143. [1902] 1 KB 527 (CA).
144. Ibid, 530–531.
145. Ibid, 531.
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Like Durham and William Brandt’s, the quite distinct issue as to the effect of precise
performance by virtue of actual payment to the original creditor never arose. In Yates, the
defendant debtor, A, never effected any payment to his creditor, B. Instead, Yates merely
applied the rule that a garnishee summons only attaches such property of the judgment
debtor as is beneficially owned by the judgment debtor.
Ex p Nichols146 was concerned with the competing priorities between the claims of a
trustee-in-bankruptcy and an equitable assignee. In Ex p Nichols, a partnership became
lessees of the Alexandra Palace. The lessees entered into a verbal contract with the Great
Northern Railway Company, on whose rail lines patrons of the Palace would travel. The
contract provided that the railway company was to collect from such patrons both the
railway fare and the price of admission to the Palace, and that it should pay to the lessees
a stated proportion of the gross sums so received with an account to be rendered monthly.
On 21 March 1882, the lessees executed a deed of assignment in favour of Younger & Co,
assigning all sums ‘‘now due and owing and hereafter to become due and owing’’ from the
railway company on trust to secure payment of debts owed by the lessors to the assignees.
Notice of the assignment was given to the railway company on 22 March 1882. But on
10 August 1882 the lessees submitted a liquidation petition.
On 11 August 1882, Nichols was appointed as receiver and manager of the lessees’
property and business. Nichols gave notice of his appointment to the railway company on
12 August 1882 and requested that it forward the lessees’ share of the gross receipts of
railway fare and admission fees collected by the railway company from 10 August 1882.
Nichols continued to operate the Alexandra Palace until 31 August 1882, and the lessees’
share of the gross receipts from 10 August until 31 August 1882 came up to £587 3s 8d.
Meanwhile, on 8 September 1882, Nichols was appointed by the partnership creditors as
trustee in the liquidation of the partnership. The question then arose whether the assignees
had a better claim to this sum than did Nichols as trustee. The Court of Appeal held that
Nichols had the better claim.
The ratio of the case was simply that, ‘‘by no assignment or charge can a bankrupt give
a good title against his trustee to profits of his business accruing after the commencement
of the bankruptcy. The bankrupt cannot as against the trustee assign these profits; they are
not his property’’.147 Jessel MR was of the view that, on these facts, the business had been
carried out by Nichols after the filing of the petition ‘‘ex relatione by the trustee for the
benefit of the bankrupts’ estate’’ and there was, therefore, no analogy to be drawn to ‘‘to
cases in which the property of a bankrupt has been validly charged by him before his
bankruptcy’’.148 This is highly significant.
The lessors were made bankrupt pursuant to the Bankruptcy Act 1869.149 Section 12 of
that Act provided:150
‘‘Where a debtor shall be adjudicated a bankrupt, no creditor to whom the bankrupt is indebted in
respect of any debt provable in the bankruptcy shall have any remedy against the property or person
of the bankrupt in respect of such debt except in manner directed by this Act. But this section shall
146. (1883) 22 Ch D 782, 787. This case is re-examined in Part VII.
147. Ibid, 786.
148. Ibid.
149. 32 & 33 Vict c 71. The Bankruptcy Act 1883, 46 & 47 Vict c 52, only came into force on 1 January
1884.
150. Emphasis added.
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not affect the power of any creditor holding a security upon the property of the bankrupt to realize
or otherwise deal with such security in the same manner as he would have been entitled to realize
or deal with the same if this section had not been passed’’.
The issue before the Court of Appeal in Ex p Nichols was, therefore, whether the assignees
were ‘‘creditors holding a security upon the property of the bankrupt’’ so as to fall within
the ambit of the exclusion set out in the italicised portion of s 12 reproduced above. If they
were, they would have been entitled to take steps to enforce their security, notwithstanding
the vesting of the bankrupt’s incorporeal property in the form of choses in action in the
trustee-in-bankruptcy,151 which, by the doctrine of relation-back,152 would presumably
have occurred on 10 August 1882 when the lessees filed their liquidation petition.153
It was critical in this case that the ‘‘gross sums’’ in issue could have arisen only in so
far as Nichols had continued to carry on the business of the Alexandra Palace. Had he not
done so, the railway company would have been unable to charge its passengers the gross
sum for both transport and admission to the Palace, for there would have been no such
passengers (or, at best, precious few). So, within the context of bankruptcy, this was not
a case of an assignment by way of security of debts accruing due in futuro (as to which
the principle of Tailby v. Official Receiver154 would apply) but something else altogether.
As Lord Esher MR observed in Wilmot v. Alton:155
‘‘The case of Ex parte Nichols, In re Jones, seems to me to shew that the right to payments under
a contract which are not debts at the date of the bankruptcy, but will only become due in future if
certain conditions are fulfilled, is not a right which can be transferred so as to deprive the trustee in
bankruptcy of his claim under the contract’’.
So Ex p Nichols should be understood as setting out a special rule for the purposes of
determining whether a bankrupt’s incorporeal property such as a contractual chose in
action had passed to his trustee-in-bankruptcy, or whether that property formed part of the
security given to a creditor of the bankrupt which would fall within the proviso to s 12 of
the 1869 Act.156 Reliance on this case as authority for any broader proposition is, perhaps,
unwise.
The cases discussed above will hardly exhaust all of the decisions where the principle
has received seeming judicial approval. But by this stage of the argument it should be
clear that the theoretical underpinnings of the ‘‘no discharge after notice’’ rule appear
somewhat weak, and the usual English authorities157 are, on closer examination,
inconclusive. Thus, the way seems open to acknowledge that there may well be no such
rule, at least in relation to equitable assignments of debts. But that raises the question:
would a debtor faced with notice of a statutory assignment be treated any differently?
151. Ibid, s 22.
152. Ibid, s 11.
153. Ibid, s 6(4); the report gives no indication of any other act of bankruptcy.
154. (1888) 13 App Cas 523.
155. [1897] 1 QB 17 (CA), 21. See also Rigby LJ’s judgment at 24.
156. See also In re Davis & Co (1888) 22 QBD 193 (CA), 199; In re Collins [1925] 1 Ch 556, 561–563; King
v. Michael Faraday and Partners Ltd [1939] 2 KB 753, 760; In re Tout & Finch Ltd [1954] 1 WLR 178,
186–187; In re Green [1979] 1 WLR 1211, 1221.
157. There is also the Privy Council decision of Colonial Mutual Insurance v. ANZ Banking Group [1995]
1 WLR 1140; but that opinion is not binding, and for the reasons set out at n 82, supra, it is hoped it will not
be followed.
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VIII. ‘‘NO DISCHARGE AFTER NOTICE OF A STATUTORY
ASSIGNMENT’’
As Dr Tolhurst suggests, it seems that most notices to debtors do not specify the precise
mode of assignment that has occurred, nor will it occur to many debtors to make such
inquiry. He therefore observes that a difference in treatment between equitable assignment
and statutory assignment will create an unworkable (or at least unhelpful) distinction
between them.158 It will be argued below that no such distinction ought to be made.
A. An assignor ‘‘drops out of the picture’’ following a statutory assignment—or
does he?
The ‘‘unworkable distinction’’ that Dr Tolhurst warns us of arises from the view that, ‘‘as
there is no [statutory] assignment until notice and upon notice the assignor drops out of
the picture as the legal right is assigned. Thus, only the assignee can provide the obligor
with a discharge’’.159 In contrast, commencing from the fifth edition of Treitel on
Contract,160 it has been observed that, ‘‘Where the assignment is statutory, the debtor
ceases, as soon as notice has been given, to be liable to the assignor . . . ’’.161
For Dr Tolhurst, it appears that, unlike the analysis of equitable assignment of a debt
outlined above, where the debtor may be discharged if he makes payment to the assignor
(as a matter of discharge by performance) or to the assignee (typically, absent any express
or implied term permitting unilateral variation of the debtor’s obligations, as a matter of
accord and satisfaction reached on the basis of an agreement between the debtor and her
158. Tolhurst, [8.06].
159. Ibid.
160. GH Treitel, The Law of Contract, 5th edn (London, 1979), 506. Authority for this proposition is found
in Cottage Club Estates Ltd v. Woodside Estates (Amersham) Ltd [1928] QB 463, 467. From the 7th edition
onwards, reference is also made to The Halcyon The Great [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 283, 289. Quaere whether The
Halcyon The Great simply stands for the proposition that the benefit of an arbitration clause is capable of being
assigned, as was held to be the case in Shayler v. Woolf [1946] Ch 320 and Aspell v. Seymour [1929] WN
152.
161. Accepting that Cottage Club Estates Ltd v. Woodside Estates Co (Amersham) Ltd [1928] 2 KB 463
involved a statutory assignment (following Burlinson v. Hall (1884) 12 QBD 347; Tancred v. Delagoa Bay and
East Africa Ry Co (1889) 23 QBD 239; Hughes v. Pump House Hotel Co Ltd [1902] 2 KB 190 (CA)), the dispute
in that case arose over what was due to be paid by a property developer for work done by a firm of builders. The
issue was whether the statutory assignment (by way of mortgage) by the builders to their bank of the sums due
under the contract precluded them from referring the matter to arbitration to seek an award for such sum. First,
Wright J held that the contracting parties’ right to refer their dispute to arbitration was ‘‘personal’’ and therefore
non-assignable. Therefore, the builders were entitled to refer the matter to arbitration (at 466). However, Wright
J was of the view that the arbitral award in favour of the builders was bad on its face in light of the statutory
assignment to the builders’ bankers and thus refused to uphold it. Instead, Wright J upheld the alternative award
by the arbitrator, that the builders were not entitled to recover anything (at 468). The authoritativeness of the
decision, at least on the first point, is suspect: cf Aspell v. Seymour [1929] WN 152 (CA) and Shayler v. Woolf
[1946] 1 Ch 323 (CA). In both cases, it was pointed out that the Arbitration Act 1889, s 4 was predicated on the
assignability of an arbitration clause (Aspel, 152, per Lord Hanworth MR; and Shayler, 323 and 324, per Lord
Greene MR and Morton LJ respectively). In Shayler, 324, Somervell LJ also held that an arbitration clause was
not so ‘‘personal’’ as to be non-assignable. Lastly, there are dicta in The Halcyon The Great [1984] 1 Lloyd’s
Rep 283, 289, per Staughton J, to the effect that, ‘‘the better view is that upon a legal [ie, statutory] assignment
the assignor loses the right to arbitrate and the assignee acquires it’’. In any event, Cottage Estates did not require
Wright J to consider what might have been the case had the building contractors been paid what was due, and
to consider whether such payment in precise performance would have discharged the developers from their
contractual payment obligations.
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creditor), the same may not be true of a debt which has been statutorily assigned because
the ‘‘transfer’’ effected by the statutory assignment causes the assignor to ‘‘drop out of the
picture’’. But a closer reading of the provisions of the Act suggests, perhaps, something
rather different.
B. What does a statutory assignment ‘‘transfer’’?
The Law of Property Act 1925, s 136(1) provides:162
‘‘Any absolute assignment by writing under the hand of the assignor (not purporting to be by way
of charge only) of any debt or other legal thing in action, of which express notice in writing has been
given to the debtor, trustee or other person from whom the assignor would have been entitled to
claim such debt or thing in action, is effectual in law (subject to equities having priority over the
right of the assignee) to pass and transfer from the date of such notice —
(a) the legal right to such debt or thing in action:
(b) all legal and other remedies for the same; and
(c) the power to give a good discharge for the same without the concurrence of the assignor:
Provided that, if the debtor, trustee or other person liable in respect of such debt or thing in action
has notice—
(a) that the assignment is disputed by the assignor or any person claiming under him; or
(b) of any other opposing or conflicting claim to such debt or thing in action;
he may, if he thinks fit, either call upon the persons making claim thereto to interplead concerning
the same, or pay the debt or other thing in action into court under the provisions of the Trustee Act
1925.’’
As Lord Esher MR explained163 in relation to the Judicature Act 1873, s 25(6) (the
legislative precursor to s 136(1)), when the assignor’s ‘‘legal right’’ to the debt is
statutorily assigned to the assignee, the assignor will have taken from him the right to sue
for it, which is the very thing the assignee gains. So, where the debt assigned becomes due
and owing, the statutory assignee is entitled to sue the debtor on that unpaid debt in his
own name. If he succeeds, the court will issue judgment against the defaulting defendant
(the debtor), in favour of the successful claimant164 (who may only be the assignee, this
being a statutory assignment).165 Accordingly, the statutory assignee’s cause of action
against the debtor would then be merged with the judgment. Just as would have been the
case where an equitable assignee obtains judgment against the debtor, where the statutory
assignee brings a claim and obtains judgment against the debtor, the statutory assignee/
claimant becomes a judgment creditor, the debtor/defendant becomes a judgment debtor,
and the cause of action is merged with the judgment of the court.166 Consequently, the
cause of action is extinguished, and in its place we find new rights created by the
162. Emphasis added.
163. Read v. Brown (1888) 22 QBD 128, 132 (emphasis added), per Lord Esher, MR, with whom Fry LJ was
in complete agreement. The remaining judge, Lopes LJ, expressed his agreement with Lord Esher’s construction
of s 25(6). See also Bovis Lend Lease Ltd v. Saillard Fuller & Partners (2001) 77 Const LR 134, [113].
164. Supra, n 6.
165. In the case of an equitable assignment, where the assignor is willing to cooperate in the bringing of an
action against the defaulting debtor, the assignor and the assignee would be co-claimants. If the assignor is
unwilling to cooperate, then the assignee would be the sole claimant.
166. See Part VI(C), supra.
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judgment. None of this, however, touches upon the quite distinct question, as to what it
is that the debtor must do in order to find herself quit of her contractual obligations.
As with equitable assignments of a debt,167 a distinction remains between having the
right to sue for payment of the debt, and the question of what amounts to ‘‘payment of the
debt’’. This distinction is preserved by the statute: that what is ‘‘transferred’’ to
the assignee is the assignor’s ‘‘legal right to such debt or thing in action’’.168 What the
assignor would have been legally entitled to insist that the debtor do, however, depends
on the construction of the contract which gives rise to that right, and nothing in the statute
provides that statutory assignment is to effect any variation of such right.169
Read v. Brown tells us that in a statutory assignment the assignee is released from the
need to join the assignor as a party to the action because he has had transferred to him the
legal right to bring an action on the debt (or thing in action) that has been assigned: he
may bring the action solely in his own name.170 However, just as with an equitable
assignment, a statutory assignee may have transferred to it only what the assignor has at
the time of assignment. So, where A is indebted to B in the sum of £1,000, such sum to
be due to be repaid on 1 June 2009, if B effects a statutory assignment of that debt to C
on 15 May 2009, and A is given written notice of that assignment on the same day, all that
is ‘‘transferred’’ to C at this point is B’s ‘‘legal rights’’ in the debt.
As with ‘‘transfers’’ in equitable assignment,171 the ‘‘transfer’’ of a statutory assignor’s
legal rights cannot modify what it is that the debtor has bound herself to do in order to be
quit of her contractual obligations. Although the transfer effected by a statutory
assignment is seemingly effected without the need to create any fresh equitable interest in
C,172 however it be made, all that is ‘‘transferred’’ to C is B’s legal rights to the debt. So,
in effecting a transfer of those rights, there is no logical necessity that requires any
modification to the content of those rights, to what it is that the obligor under those
arrangements is legally bound to do. Unless, on its true construction, the debt contains
terms whereby the debtor is obliged to make payment to, not just B, but, in the alternative,
other parties such as B’s assigns or nominees, all C is entitled to, is to insist that A make
167. See Part V(B)(ii), supra.
168. This distinction may have been overlooked by the Court of Appeal in Knill v. Prowse (1884) 33 WR 163.
In that case, pursuant to the Judicature Act 1873, s 25(6), Knill was statutorily assigned Benham’s right to rents
payable on premises that had been leased to Prowse. Notice was duly given to Prowse, and Prowse paid Knill
the monthly rent that was due for the next seven months. Benham then asked Prowse to cease such payments.
Accordingly, for the months of February and March 1884, Prowse paid the rent for the leased premises to
Benham instead. Knill sued Prowse for the rents in arrear for those two months, and succeeded. In coming to
its decision, the court merely stated that there was an ‘‘absolute assignment by Benham to the plaintiff [Knill]’’.
Had the court been given the opportunity to consider precisely what it was that had been assigned to Knill, given
the wording of the statute, it is submitted that the outcome ought to have been quite otherwise. It should be noted,
however, that, had Knill been assigned the reversion of the lease, Prowse’s payment of rent to Benham would
certainly not have discharged his obligation to pay Knill rent on the lease, as such obligation would have ‘‘run
with the land’’: see n 90, supra.
169. Given the analysis above as to how equitable assignment and notice thereof may not effect such
modification of common law obligations, and on the view that statutory assignment merely provides a more
straightforward procedure for assignment but does not affect its substance (see, eg, Re Westerton [1919] 2 Ch
104, 133; Marchant v. Morton, Down & Co [1901] 2 KB 829, 832; Smith, [10.06]; Marshall, 161 and 166), this
must, a fortiori, follow.
170. Read v. Brown (1888) 22 QBD 128.
171. See Parts V(A) and (B), supra.
172. There is a long standing debate over this: see WW Cook, ‘‘The alienability of choses in action’’ (1916)
29 Harv L Rev 816; S Williston, ‘‘Is the right of an assignee of a chose in action legal or equitable?’’ (1916) 30
Harv L Rev 99.
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payment of the £1,000 due and owing to B. Just as is the case with an equitable
assignment, although statutory assignment addresses the question to whom a debtor is
liable, it has nothing to say as to what the debtor is liable to do.173
C. Is a debtor discharged from her obligation under the contract if she pays the
statutory assignor?
Coming back to the chose in action in debt, which is the subject matter of this paper, what
is striking about the provisions in the 1925 Act is that, although they refer to a statutorily
sanctioned ‘‘transfer’’ of the assignor’s legal rights (s 136(1)(a)) and remedies
(s 136(1)(b)) in relation to the debt so assigned, as well as to the assignor’s ability to give
a good discharge for the debt (s 136(1)(c)), there is nothing in the express words of the
provision that bars discharge of the obligation of debt by precise performance of that
obligation in accordance with the express terms of the contract of debt as originally agreed
between the debtor and creditor. This is unsurprising, given the similarity in phrasing with
the words used by Simon Brown LJ in his judgment in Deposit Protection Board v.
Dalia,174 discussed above.175
There, Simon Brown LJ said that the assignor would not be able to give a good
discharge of the debt following an equitable assignment of that debt. But, just as neither
the issue of discharge by performance nor the availability of the defence of tender have
anything to do with the question of giving a discharge at the discretion of an equitable
assignor,176 so too with a statutory assignment. On reflection, it should also be obvious
that neither precise performance nor tender has anything to do with the transfer of the
assignor’s rights and remedies.
Precise performance effects discharge automatically, as a matter of law, whereas tender
of payment pertains to a defence available to the debtor, such defence being premised on
an obligation on the creditor to cooperate. Thus, although s 136(1) statutorily ‘‘transfers’’
the assignor’s legal right to bring an action on the debt, such legal remedies as would have
been available to the assignor pursuant to such an action, and the assignor’s power to give
a good discharge (to the extent that it is now the assignee who may do so) as well as the
assignor’s rights and remedies vis-a`-vis the debtor (and therefore it is the assignee to
whom the debtor is liable), it is silent on the question of performance of the contractual
obligation of payment to the assignor in precise conformity with the contract’s terms
where that payment is accepted by the creditor. Just as it is with equitable assignment,
173. One might think that this conclusion is contradicted by the result in Flower v. Lyme Regis Corp [1921]
1 KB 488 (CA). Close reading of the judgment suggests that the point made above as to the effect of discharge
by performance in the face of notice of a statutory assignment was not brought before the court. It seems that
the sum paid to the statutory assignor in that case was not a payment in precise fulfilment of what was due, but
a negotiated sum in settlement of a dispute as to what was due under the contract. That is, it was a payment in
exchange for the grant of a good discharge. So it would seem that Flower was simply a case that applied the
principle that the power to give a good discharge is also transferred to the statutory assignee (see the Judicature
Act 1873, s 25(6), or the Law of Property Act 1925, s 136(1), as would now be the case).
174. [1994] 2 AC 367 (CA).
175. At text to n 15, supra.
176. The arguments for this being fully set out in Part V, supra.
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s 136(1) leaves utterly unchanged what amounts to precise performance by the debtor.177
And, even if s 136(1) permits an assignee to bring legal proceedings against the debtor to
demand that she perform her contractual obligation, the content of that obligation remains
unchanged (unless the contractual terms provide otherwise). So, if she should have made
payment to her creditor prior to such demand, although the assignee would be entitled to
sue the debtor in his own name, his suit must surely fail—the chose in action would have
been discharged.
D. Is a debtor discharged from her obligation under the contract if she pays the
statutory assignee?
As with the case of an equitable assignment, we need to distinguish between two types of
case. One, where the debtor has chosen to make payment to the statutory assignee, and has
done so. And the other, where the debtor did not make any payment at all when the debt
became due, but is then compelled to make payment on account of judgment having been
handed down against her.
Where the contract terms provide only that the debtor is to make payment to a particular
named creditor and, on a true construction of the contract, only to that named entity,
payment to the statutory assignee cannot amount to precise performance so as to effect a
discharge of the debtor’s payment obligation. But, as with the analysis above,178 apart
from the ameliorative effects of estoppel, the problem may be circumvented should the
courts be willing to interpret the contract in an expansive manner instead (as occurred in
Portland Cement).179 Alternatively, it is possible to construe notices of equitable
assignment as constituting either unilateral or bilateral offers of variation. If the debtor is
found to have accepted such offers, she would be released from her original obligation to
make payment to the original creditor, and will be obliged to make payment to the
‘‘assignee’’ instead. It is suggested that these two forms of analysis are just as applicable
to a case where a debtor elects to make payment to a statutory assignee.
The alternative case, though, is where the debtor elects not to make any payment at all,
to either statutory assignor or assignee—ie, where the debtor is in breach. Here, as with
the analysis above in relation to equitable assignments,180 the key concept is that of
merger. And the analysis there applies with equal force to the case of a statutory assignee
who has successfully obtained judgment in its favour.
It therefore seems that the ‘‘no discharge after notice’’ rule is inapplicable to all
assignments of contractual debts, whether statutory or equitable. This may seem to be
commercially unpalatable. But, were matters otherwise, as the next Part will show, equally
177. The point is even clearer where some other legal thing in action has been statutorily assigned. Revisiting
our earlier example (n 33, supra) of the painter, J, who has contracted to paint K’s house white: assuming for
the sake of argument that such an obligation is not ‘‘too personal’’ to be capable of being assigned, if K were
to ‘‘statutorily assign’’ the benefit of that contract to L, the owner of a house down the road, what would that
entail? It could not mean that L would be entitled, as statutory assignee, to insist that J paint his house instead
of K’s. Such an assignment could only ever entail an assignment of K’s right to bring legal proceedings against
J, in so far as J’s performance had fallen short of what he had agreed to do—which was to paint K’s house. This
appears to be consistent with the decision in Offer-Hoar v. Larkstore Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 1079; [2006] 1
WLR 2926, [41], per Mummery LJ, with whom Rix LJ and Peter Smith J agreed.
178. Part VI(A) and (B).
179. [1903] AC 414; supra, text to and following n 91.
180. Part VI(C).
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unpalatable conclusions will have to be drawn regarding who should receive tender of
payment. Awkward distinctions might then be required as to when contractual burdens
might be assigned.
IX. TENDER OF PERFORMANCE AND THE ASSIGNMENT OF
BURDENS
If it is right to say that notice of assignment has the effect of precluding the operation of
the doctrine of discharge by performance despite the debtor’s actual payment of the debt
to her creditor, what if payment could only have been effected with the cooperation of the
creditor, as is the usual case where payment is to be made in cash? There does not appear
to be any reported English authority on the point,181 but it would seem to follow that, in
such cases, tender of payment to the creditor, following notice of the assignment, ought
not to operate as a good defence; tender ought to be made to the assignee instead. This,
if correct, creates some difficulties of its own.
Anson’s Law of Contract states:182
‘‘Tender is attempted performance; and the word is applied to attempted performance of two kinds,
dissimilar in their results. It is applied to a performance of a promise to do something, and of a
promise to pay something. In each case the performance is prevented by the act of the party for
whose benefit it is to take place’’.
The difference in treatment relates to the effect of non-acceptance of a tender of payment,
as opposed to a tender of acts. In the latter, the defence operates to excuse further
performance of the tendered act. In the former, however, the payor must remain ready to
pay the tendered sum, and must pay that sum into court to take advantage of the defence.
But that need not detain us. For present purposes, the important point is that the underlying
principle for the defence of tender of an act or of payment is the same.
As Rolfe B observed in Startup v. MacDonald:183
‘‘[I]n every contract by which a party binds himself to deliver goods, or pay money, to another, he
in fact engages to do an act which he cannot completely perform without the concurrence of the
party to whom the delivery or the payment is to be made. Without acceptance on the part of him who
is to receive, the act of him who is to deliver or to pay, can amount only to a tender. But the law
considers a party who has entered into a contract to deliver goods or pay money to another, as
having substantially, performed it, if he has tendered the goods or money to the party to whom the
delivery or payment was to be made, provided only that the tender has been made under such
circumstances that the party to whom it has been made, has had a reasonable opportunity of
examining the goods, or the money, tendered, in order to ascertain that the thing tendered really was
what it purported to be’’.
There is more. In the same case, Parke B observed that:184
181. At [6.120], Tolhurst cites the case of Bay of Plenty Electricity Ltd v. Natural Gas Corporation Energy
Ltd [2002] 1 NZLR 173, 181 as authority for the point that the assignee must be subject to the same obligation
to accept tender of performance as the assignor would have done, had there been no assignment.
182. J Beatson, Anson’s Law of Contract, 28th edn (Oxford, 2002), 508.
183. (1843) 6 M & G 593, 610; 134 ER 1029, 1036 (emphasis added), per Rolfe B, with whom Gurney B
concurred.
184. (1843) 6 M & G 593, 624; 134 ER 1029, 1042 (emphasis added).
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‘‘[I]f he [the debtor or obligor] is to pay a sum of money, he must tender it a sufficient time before
midnight for the party to whom the tender is made, to receive and count; or if he is to deliver goods,
he must tender them so as to allow sufficient time for examination and receipt. This done, he has,
so far as he could, paid or delivered within the time; and it is by the fault of the other only, that the
payment or delivery is not complete’’.
So the creditor/obligee is at fault for wrongfully refusing to accept a conforming tender.
But how may this be, unless we accept that the creditor/obligee is under an obligation to
cooperate with the debtor/obligor in so far as such cooperation is required to enable the
debtor/obligor to complete the performance of her obligations?
Indeed, the principle of Mackay v. Dick185 would seem to mandate the implication of
such a duty to cooperate. As Lord Uthwatt noted in McCarrick v. Liverpool Corp:186
‘‘in any contract whatever its nature, it is a general rule that, if the thing agreed to be done cannot
effectually be done unless both parties concur in it, the proper construction of the contract requires
the implication of a term that each agrees to do all that is necessary to be done on his part for the
carrying out of that thing’’.
That being so, would the proposition that a debtor may only tender to the assignee,
following notice of an assignment, not also involve the proposition that there had been an
assignment of the creditor/obligee’s obligation to cooperate with the debtor?
To say that the combined effect of assignment and notice gives rise to a rule of ‘‘no
discharge after notice’’ would be also to deny the possibility that a debtor might tender
such performance to the creditor.187 But this seems to sit awkwardly with the proposition
that the defence of tender is premised on the obligation of the creditor/obligee to accept
a tender of performance which is in conformity with the terms of the contract. And few
matters about the doctrine of assignment are as clear as the rule that only benefits
associated with personalty but not burdens may be assigned.188 That burden to co-operate
with the debtor, in so far as the debtor’s precise performance requires such cooperation,
cannot be ‘‘assigned’’ to the assignee, at least in the sense that the assignor is to be
185. (1881) 6 App Cas 251 (HL, on appeal from a judgment of the First Division of the Court of Session,
Scotland). See ibid, 263, per Lord Blackburn: ‘‘I think I may safely say, as a general rule, that where in a written
contract it appears that both parties have agreed that something shall be done, which cannot effectually be done
unless both concur in doing it, the construction of the contract is that each agrees to do all that is necessary to
be done on his part for the carrying out of that thing, though there may be no express words to that effect’’. The
principle is not limited to written contracts but is of general application: MacCarrick v. Liverpool Corp [1947]
1 AC 219, 231.
186. Ibid, 231. Admittedly, such implication arises in fact and not in law. Eg, in Luxor (Eastbourne) Ltd v.
Cooper [1941] AC 108, 148–149, although Lord Wright recognised the principle in Mackay v. Dick, he was not
prepared to make such an implication on the facts of that case.
187. Dr Tolhurst has also recognised that there is a problem with the assignment analysis if it does not also
permit the transfer of the ‘‘burden’’ that an assignee ‘‘must accept a tender of conforming goods or services’’:
Tolhurst, [6.120]. To resolve this difficulty, Dr Tolhurst relies and expands on the maxim that an assignee must
‘‘take the burdens with the benefits’’, and builds on both the conditional and the pure principle of benefit and
burden set out by Megarry V-C in Tito v. Waddell [1977] Ch 106, 289–311; Tolhurst, [6.103–6.135]. But saying
that in some cases the burden of a contract might pass by assignment explains nothing: Anon, ‘‘Obligations of
the Assignee of a Bilateral Contract’’ (1929) 42 Harv L Rev 941, 943. In any event, the proposition in this paper
is that such elaboration is unnecessary because the problem arises only if it is true that assignment has the effect
of preventing discharge by precise performance to the original obligee, in disregard of prior notice of assignment
to an assignee.
188. Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v. Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd [1994] 1 AC 85, 103; Nokes v. Doncaster
Amalgamated Collieries Ltd [1940] AC 1014, 1019–1020. The point was also accepted by Lord Templeman in
Rhone v. Stephens (Executrix) [1994] 2 AC 310, 316.
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released from his obligations to the debtor (for that would require novation or, at the very
least, assent by the debtor to release the creditor from his obligation to accept a
conforming tender of payment), or for the assignee to become contractually obliged to the
debtor (for that would require privity of contract). So continued adherence to the
perceived status quo carries within it a significant risk that may be just as commercially
repugnant, if not more so. Nor does there appear to be much judicial appetite for such an
extension.189
On the analysis in this paper, if the debtor elects to pay her original creditor despite
having been notified of the notice, an assignee may lose the advantage of the chose in
action the benefit of which has been assigned. This seems commercially shocking. But, if
matters were otherwise, logic dictates that the obligation of cooperation which underlies
the doctrine of tender must also have passed from the creditor-assignor to the assignee.
That represents a weakening of the rule that the burdens of a contract may not be assigned.
And, if this rule is weakened in relation to the obligation of cooperation, where do we
stop?
X. THE ASSIGNEE’S POSITION FOLLOWING PAYMENT TO THE
ASSIGNOR
If it were true that payment by A to B discharges A’s debt once that payment is accepted
by B, regardless of A’s having been notified of the equitable assignment to C, there would
not be room for C to bring any direct action against A on that chose in action, since the
right to bring legal proceedings against A for non-payment of the debt would have been
extinguished by force of the common law.190 But can C bring proceedings against B?
Certainly he may.
On the one hand, there is some judicial authority supporting the proposition that in such
circumstances, B is personally liable to account to C for the sums received. This is plainly
set out by Lindley LJ, delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Re Patrick, Bills
189. Leaving aside the position as between landlords and tenants (as to which see n 90, supra), at common
law, when realty is transferred, no covenant may run with the land so as to bind the covenantor’s successors in
title. And even in Equity, the rule in Tulk v. Moxhay (1848) 3 Ph 774; 41 ER 1143, read in light of Haywood
v. Brunswick Permanent Benefit Building Soc (1881) 8 QBD 403, only applies to permit restrictive covenants to
run with the land. When given the opportunity to extend that rule to permit positive covenants to run with the
land, the House of Lords refused to do so: Rhone v. Stephens (Executrix) [1994] 2 AC 310, 318, per Lord
Templeman. Mindful of the dramatic upheaval in settled practice were it to up-end the settled understanding of
the limits of the Tulk v. Moxhay doctrine (as to which, see J Snape, ‘‘The Burden of Positive Covenants—Rhone
v. Stephens (Executrix)’’ [1994] Conv 477, 481), the House of Lords desisted, preferring to leave the matter to
Parliament (see Rhone v. Stephens [1994] 2 AC 310, 321). Further, Parliament may have already filled the gap
vis-a`-vis the ‘‘assignment’’ of burdens with the enactment of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act
1999.
190. In his judgment in Tolhurst v. Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers [1902] 2 KB 660 (CA), 668,
Lord Collins MR said, ‘‘The right [to assign the benefit of a contract in equity] seems . . .  to be based on the
equitable principle that it would be against conscience on the part of the person on whom the obligation lay to
discharge it to the original contractee [sic] after he had notice that the latter had assigned the benefit of it to
another person’’. The point was not taken by the House of Lords; but, accepting that there is such an equitable
principle so as to entitle the assignee to seek an injunction to enjoin the debtor from tendering payment to the
creditor-assignor, wherein lies the jurisdiction of the court to disregard the operation of the common law rules
as to discharge by performance in circumstances where no such injunction has been granted prior to
payment?
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v. Tatham.191 In that case, a settlor created a trust in favour of certain beneficiaries over
certain specialty debts secured by bills of sale that were owed to him. The voluntary deed
of settlement provided inter alia that the principal sums owed, all interest due or to
become due thereon, and all the estate and interest of the settlor therein was to vest in the
trustees for the benefit of the settlor’s wife, her sisters, as well as the settlor’s own sister.
This was, in the circumstances, an equitable assignment of the debts to the trustees by way
of trust and not absolutely. The settlor died intestate without delivering any of the bills of
sale to the trustees and before any of these debts were repaid: the sums due were
ultimately paid to the settlor’s legal personal representative.
The questions before the Court of Appeal were: (i) whether the debts had been
completely assigned by the settlement such that the trustees, as assignees, would have
been able to recover those debts from the various debtors without any further assistance
from the settlor; and (ii) whether the settlor (in the form of his personal representative)
having himself received payment of the sums owed (no notice of the assignment ever
having been given to the debtors) was liable to make good to the trustees of the settlement
the amount received by him.192
Having found that there had been a complete assignment of the debts within the
principle of Kekewich v. Manning,193 as to (ii), Lindley LJ said:194
‘‘If once the conclusion is arrived at that the assignment of the debts was complete, and not
incomplete, it follows that the settlor, having got in the debts himself, is accountable to the trustees
of the settlement for the amount he so got in. This was decided in Fortescue v. Barnett[195]’’.
This would be a perfectly adequate remedy so long as the settlor’s estate was solvent. But
what if it was not? Could the trustees assert a proprietary remedy in the alternative?
Lindley LJ seems to have thought not:196
‘‘There is no question here of following trust money, and the right of the plaintiffs is only to rank
as creditors against the estate of the deceased for the amount of the debts he got in . . . ’’.
Despite this, it is submitted that a reasonable case may be made in support of the
proposition that the assignees in such a case may also have a proprietary remedy. First,
Lindley LJ’s refusal to recognise the possibility of a proprietary remedy in Re Patrick is
clearly obiter: since the estate was solvent (there is no indication that it was not), the issue
did not really arise. Second, although the receipt of the monies owed by the settlor’s
personal representative would, on the analysis in this paper, discharge the chose in action,
it is difficult to see how those moneys in the personal representative’s hands would ever
not amount to the traceable substitute of the chose in action (the specialty debts) that had
been subject to the trustees’ equitable interest arising from the assignment. It follows,
therefore, that the trustees in Re Patrick would have been entitled to assert an equitable
interest to such traceable substitute, had it been necessary to do so. Last, if it were
191. [1890] 1 Ch 82.
192. Ibid, 86.
193. (1851) 1 De G M & G 176; 42 ER 519.
194. [1890] 1 Ch 82, 87.
195. (1834) 3 My & K 36, 40.
196. [1890] 1 Ch 82, 87.
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necessary to provide authority for the proposition, one might consider the order made by
the Court of Appeal in Gorringe v. Irwell India Rubber and Gutta Percha Works.197
In that case, Heilbut, Symons & Co (‘‘Heilbut’’) supplied goods on account to the Irwell
India Rubber and Gutta Percha Works Ltd (‘‘Irwell’’). £660 14s 11d was due on the
account but Irwell was unable to make payment in full. To meet the balance, Irwell
equitably assigned to Heilbut £425 which was due to Irwell from M/s Cayzer, Irvine & Co
(‘‘Cayzer’’) for goods supplied to them by Irwell. Cayzer was notified of the equitable
assignment to Heilbut on 5 February 1885. However, prior to receipt of that notice, a
petition to wind Irwell up was presented on 2 February 1885. Cayzer paid the £425 into
a bank account held jointly by Irwell’s official liquidator and Heilbut. The issue therefore
arose whether the £425 due from Cayzer formed part of the assets of Irwell so as to be
distributed by the official liquidator, or whether the equitable assignment to Heilbut was
effective in ring-fencing the sum payable by Cayzer despite Cayzer’s having been notified
of the equitable assignment only after the petition had been filed. Although notice of the
assignment was given after the commencement of Irwell’s winding-up, the Court of
Appeal granted a declaration that Heilbut was entitled to the sum paid into the joint
account.
Leaving aside the point for which Gorringe is usually cited,198 it is plain that the order,
as made, accepted that Heilbut, as equitable assignee, did have a beneficial interest in the
traceable substitute of the chose in action that had been assigned to it. Thus, Heilbut was
entitled to the sum represented by the bank account in the names of the official liquidator
and the equitable assignee in Gorringe. Even though payment in Gorringe was not made
to the original creditor, the point remains—the equitable assignee retains an equitable right
so as to entitle it to some form of judicial assistance to recover the traceable substitute for
the chose in action discharged by the debtor’s payment in precise conformity with the
terms of her contract.199
XI. CONCLUSION
Most commentators seem to accept that, although all contractual obligations may be
automatically discharged by precise performance and such obligations are invariable at
common law unless the contract provides otherwise,200 the contractual performance
promised by an obligor may nevertheless be ‘‘varied’’ through assignment, and notice
thereof, such that discharge of such contractual performance might occur only by
performance ‘‘to’’ the assignee as opposed to performance in accordance with the original
terms of the contract. With regard to employment contracts, the courts have taken a
sceptical view of unilaterally imposed variations to contractual obligations, requiring that
197. (1887) LR 34 Ch D 128 (CA).
198. As to the immateriality of notice to the debtor where one is only concerned with ‘‘completeness’’ of an
equitable assignment as between assignor and assignee.
199. Nor was Gorringe an isolated instance; see, eg, Bence v. Shearman [1898] 2 Ch 582, 587 and 588; Re
Patrick [1891] 1 Ch 82, 87; and Barclays Bank Plc v. Willowbrook International Ltd and Anor [1987] 1 FTLR
386 (CA), 391. See also the discussion of L’Estrange v. L’Estrange (1850) 13 Beav 281; 51 ER 108, at n 32
supra.
200. Following Re Schebsman [1944] Ch 83, Equity made no rule otherwise.
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the power to do so must be expressed clearly and unequivocally.201 Yet outside that
context, and particularly in relation to debt obligations, the shoe seems to be on the other
foot. Hitherto, this has been ‘‘explained’’ by saying simply that notice of an equitable
assignment will have such an effect. But by what principled reason might that be so?
Reverting to our earlier example of a creditor, L Ltd, English-incorporated and
domiciled, who assigns to an assignee X, with operations only in Baghdad, a debt owed
to it by D:202 as noted previously, it is plain that if D is expected to seek X out and to make
payment to X, D’s obligations will have become much more onerous than they had been
at the time of contract. So, to the extent that the identity of the payee in a contract of debt
functions as shorthand to indicate part of the parameters of what is required to be done to
discharge the debt, such delimitation is of benefit to the debtor and is not to be cast away
without some quid pro quo.203
The need to re-examine the source of the supposed rule that warns against D’s paying
C, despite the notice of equitable assignment to X, for fear of its not discharging the debt
obligation, is not merely an exercise in intellectual tidying-up.204 It goes to the root of
what it means to have a contractual obligation, to the certainty that, once one binds oneself
to a certain level of performance, there is no fear of any unilateral imposition of any
additional burden.205 Further, the status quo introduces instabilities of its own as it may
require the dismantling of the rule that burdens are not to be assigned.206 If so, we open
yet another can of worms.
Equitable or statutory207 assignees of debt208 ought to be more conscious as to the
fragility of their interest in that debt: that, where the contract of debt fails to make express
provision for unilateral variation of the identity of the party to whom the debtor is to effect
payment, the ability of assignees to insist unilaterally that the debtor make such payment
to them instead of to the creditor will depend on the willingness of the court to imply the
requisite terms. It may well be that in general the courts will be willing to do so, as may
be observed most obviously in Portland Cement.209 But there is no authority for the
proposition that such a term is to be implied in law in all contracts of debt. Any such
implication, if it occurs, appears to be an implication of fact. Much will therefore depend
on the individual facts of the case, and there will be cases where the facts go against such
implication. Indeed, the inclusion of an express anti-assignment clause within the contract
201. See, eg, Wandsworth London Borough Council v. Da Silva [1998] IRLR 193 (CA), [31]; Newbold v.
Leicester City Council [1999] ICR 1182, 1189; [1999] EWCA Civ 3115, [26].
202. Supra, at text to n 51.
203. This example also explains how it is that payment to the assignee effects a discharge of the original debt
obligation. Even if notional, the additional trouble involved in making payment to the assignee may be seen to
amount to a detriment incurred by the debtor at the creditor’s request.
204. Worthy as that, in itself, is.
205. Certainly, if a debtor expressly agrees to the possibility of an assignment of that debt, it might plausibly
be argued that such agreement impliedly encapsulates agreement to such potential enhancement of the burdens
of payment. But that is not the sort of case we are concerned with here. Our concern is with those cases where
the possibility of assignment has not been expressly addressed at the time of contract between debtor and
creditor.
206. See Part IX, supra.
207. That is, assignees who take pursuant to the Law of Property Act 1925, s 136(1).
208. Or, for that matter, any legal chose in action arising out of contract, for the arguments in this paper apply
equally, in large part, to them.
209. [1903] AC 414.
78 LLOYD’S MARITIME AND COMMERCIAL LAW QUARTERLY
©I
nf
or
m
a 
nu
ll -
 1
7/
12
/2
01
8 
08
:4
3
might well amount to a matter that would have such an effect.210 Other examples might
be found in the cases where the courts have construed the choses in action in question to
be ‘‘personal’’ to the assignor, and therefore ‘‘incapable’’ of assignment.211 Alternatively,
assignees will have to rely on the willingness of the courts to construe the notice of
assignment as constituting some form of offer of variation which, upon its acceptance by
the debtor, binds her to perform in accordance with the terms of the ‘‘new’’ contract.212 On
the other side of the transaction, a debtor who has been ‘‘notified’’ that her debt has been
assigned to a stranger no longer bears the risk of investigating the veracity of such
communications,213 so long as she performs precisely in accordance with her contractual
obligations by making payment to her contractually stipulated creditor.214
Accordingly, assignees of debts may be exposed to more legal risk than they might have
reckoned. Future acquisitions of such debt may need to be re-priced to reflect such
heightened risk. But the risk is not, perhaps, so large as to derail the wheels of commerce.
The system has worked thus far, and one might reasonably assume that courts will be
minded to take as broad a view of the matter as they have done in Portland Cement, if
given the opportunity. Further, the creditor-assignor is not just personally liable to account
for such receipts to his assignee:215 there is a strong case for the proposition that the
assignee also has a proprietary remedy as against him, so long as the creditor-assignor
retains some traceable substitute for the chose in action of sufficient value.216 Assignees
thus have some protection against insolvency risk.217 Exceptionally, where the debtor and
the creditor-assignor have actively colluded to effect payment to the creditor-assignor to
defraud the assignee, accessory liability might be imposed on the debtor on the basis of
knowing assistance.218
Whether equitable or statutory, we should pay much closer attention to what the cases
and the statutes say (and to what they do not say). Although both forms of assignment may
be said to involve a ‘‘transfer’’ of the creditor-assignor’s legal rights to the debt, the legal
logic of transfer precludes modification of the debtor’s obligation. In the case of equitable
assignment, the impossibility of such modification is reinforced by the limitations of the
equitable mechanisms that underlie it. It should thus be clear that to conclude that the
210. Cf Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v. Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd [1994] 1 AC 85, 103. But see CH Tham,
‘‘The Nature of Equitable Assignment and Anti-Assignment Clauses’’, ch 12 of J Neyers, R Bronaugh and SAG
Pitel (eds), Exploring Contract Law (Oxford, 2009).
211. On the analysis in this paper, a more transparent description of the reasoning underlying such labels
would be that these are cases where, absent any assent by the obligor as to the variation, the court is unable to
find any express term permitting unilateral variation of the contract and where it is not satisfied as to the merits
of implying such a term.
212. No doubt, unless such offer is taken to emanate from the creditor-assignor and the assignees (either
through some form of agency or through the joint-promisee doctrine), prior to the enactment of the Contracts
(Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, it would have been difficult for the assignee to bring proceedings against the
debtor directly. Nowadays, it may also be possible to view such an assignee as being a third party who is
‘‘purported’’ to have been benefited by such promises, and who may therefore rely on the 1999 Act to bring a
direct action against the debtor.
213. The dilemma faced by a debtor who is given notice of an assignment at the eleventh hour before the debt
is due to be paid is therefore defused.
214. It is a different matter if she fails to do even that and breaches the contract.
215. Supra, at text to nn 191–195.
216. Supra, at text to nn 195–198.
217. Though not the risk of the assignor-creditor’s absconding after receipt of payment from the debtor.
218. Supra, at n 77.
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debtor, following assignment, is now obliged to make payment to the assignee, more is
required: perhaps, either an express or implied term providing for such unilateral variation
of the debtor’s contractual obligation, or a finding of some form of assent by the debtor
to such modification to her contractual obligation. The rule of ‘‘no discharge after notice’’
ought, therefore, be consigned to history.
80 LLOYD’S MARITIME AND COMMERCIAL LAW QUARTERLY
